THE NATION

October 18, 1965 . . 35c

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CUBAN BESTSELLER:

The Exiles Return

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LETTERS

Mission to Hanoi

Philadelphia, Pa.

Dear Sirs: In response to the letter you published (Sept. 27) regarding the Swedish Vietnam Committee and their aim, "To undertake a humanitarian action for the people of Vietnam," I suggest the following:

Send five to ten responsible Americans to North Vietnam as a peace group. The practical purpose would be to aid in rebuilding bombed-out hospitals, schools and other public-service buildings, along with other appropriate work that lent itself to a humanitarian purpose. The symbolic purpose of such a group working for peace would be tremendous. . . .

To those readers who might be inclined morally to such a project, but disinclined to support it because of its illegality, I can only cite a recent incident with the Rev. Martin Luther King. When informed that his attempts to contact foreign governments concerning the war in Vietnam were illegal, he replied, "That's unfortunate."

I would appreciate correspondence from any interested Americans.

Lawrence H. Geller
1004 Huntingdon St.

Hopes and fears

Albany, Calif.

Dear Sirs: I must take exception to much of Antonio de Figueiredo's "Portugal: Imperialism on Credit" [*The Nation*, Sept. 13].

(*1*) "The facts that only 556 of the 582 members of the [electoral] college turned up, and that there were thirteen blank votes cast in protest" when the President was re-elected really do *not* seem to indicate that "long-dormant consciences . . . were pricked." Unfortunately, absenteeism of 4.7 per cent seems readily explained by, say, illness, and a protest vote of 2.3 per cent would be of minimal significance even in a roll-call vote, which this apparently was not.

(2) It is inexcusable for an economist to list a few foreign "investments and public and private loans," without relating them to total investment, GNP, etc. The lack of context is particularly unfortunate when the thesis is that Portugal is practicing "imperialism on credit."

(3) More than enough real horrors seem likely in Portugal's future without such wholly imaginary ones as that Salazar's death might be "the white settlers' golden opportunity to follow the example of Rhodesia in proclaiming their own unilateral declaration of independence." . . . Portugal's colonies already face guerrilla warfare, and they are much more dependent on the home country and much less likely to receive economic, diplomatic or military support. Yet even in Rhodesia, severe difficulties will result from a unilateral declaration. In Portugal's colonies, the likely results seem so much worse that serious consideration by even semi-rational whites is improbable.

Scott Keech

Cover stories

Hamilton, Ohio

Dear Sirs: The evening paper brings the news that the CIA is revealing a Soviet plot to slander and discredit the CIA and the FBI. . . . We seem to be coming face to face with one of the difficulties involved in superimposing a secret government on this nation. How many Americans will not wonder if, the CIA being what it is, this is not its way of putting itself above all criticism? How many will not ignore all documentation on the ground that the CIA can—and does—forge all the documents that it needs for any occasion?

Admittedly, the Russian equivalent of the CIA will be equally capable of doing anything that is charged, and falsifying any records necessary. When the smoke clears away, therefore, we shall probably ignore all "evidence" and act on the basis of whether we think that countries are best run by secret police, or otherwise.

W. P. Taylor

African defense

New York City

Dear Sirs: South Africa has developed a complicated maze of laws to bolster separation of the races and subjugation of the nonwhite races. Those who stand in opposition are almost certain to figure as defendants in the continuing—and numerous—trials. Figures released by the Minister of Justice on April 21, 1965 show that some 3,000 persons were hailed for political reasons from January, 1964, through December, 1965.

The high rate of release in a police state which is paranoic about advocates of racial equality is largely due to the efforts of a courageous band of South Africans operating the South African Defense and Aid Fund, to provide legal defense for those charged.

We urge all who sympathize to send funds to: Africa Defense and Aid Fund (for South Africa), Room 705, 211 East 43 Street, New York 10017.

A. Philip Randolph, Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick, Dr. Donald Harrington, Dr. Henry P. Van Dusen.

THE NATION

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The President's Chance

If President Johnson and his UN Ambassador sought some assurance against domestic political blackmail on "the peace issue," the Pope's visit was the answer to their prayers. Indeed, one can imagine that a man of Mr. Johnson's political acumen might have solicited the visit for the express purpose of making peace in Vietnam politically possible (in fact, the credit must go to Secretary-General U Thant and to the Pope himself). But who originated the idea and pressed it to a conclusion is unimportant. The opportunity is now wide open, and it may never present itself in this form again.

Paul VI's message was unmistakable, and more specific than could have been anticipated. Obliquely, he touched on the desirability of China's admission to the UN; on the flight west, asked by Barrett McGurn of the New York *Herald Tribune* if he would be willing to include Peking in his travels, he answered, "Certainly." Catholic support for a settlement in Vietnam was implied. The speech gave unstinting praise to the UN, and Catholic nationalists will be hard pressed henceforth to make common cause with Protestant extremists in attacking the world organization.

To be sure, the message may not get through to the minds and hearts of those American Catholics who have been in the forefront of the advocates of a harsh policy in Vietnam. From the outset, the Catholic interest in Vietnam has been a major aspect of the problem. The Catholic minority in South Vietnam has been a dominant concern of every U.S. President since the French defeat and General Eisenhower's decision to intervene. *The Nation* pointed out editorially, during John F. Kennedy's brief tenure, which coincided with open strife between the Buddhists and the Catholics, that the latter must be protected against reprisals in any settlement of the civil war. But the idea that Vietnam should be the site of a Catholic crusade received no support from Pope John XXIII, and Paul VI's appearance before the UN negates it further. Catholics, both clergy and laymen—Sen. Thomas Dodd, for example—should have got the signal loud and clear.

President Johnson did not embroil America in Vietnam; the war was bequeathed to him. Harkening to the war hawks, and apparently hoping for a decisive victory before the 1966 elections, he has enlarged the war to the point where it has become intolerably dirty and shameful. Mr. Johnson now has a chance to rid himself of some of the odium which he has brought on himself. All he need do—and he has the power—is to declare unilaterally the cease-fire which the UN brought about in Kashmir. Neither in Vietnam nor in Kashmir can such an action bring lasting peace by itself, but it is an indispensable step toward a solution. The President is commander in chief of the armed forces. He can order the admirals and generals to silence the guns and ground the planes. The troops can stand their ground and, if fired on, return the fire, but the chances are that the fighting would stop and the way would be open for negotiations.

As this is written, the President is about to undergo surgery. Together with all Americans, *The Nation* wishes him a speedy recovery. *The Nation* wishes also that Mr. Johnson might use this enforced vacation from daily responsibilities to weigh the stature and the possibilities of Pope Paul's "appeal to the moral conscience of man."

The Bigger War

What the President should do in Vietnam, and what he will do, are not likely to be the same thing. If the Pope's visit to the UN had come before the massive escalation of the war, the odds would likewise have been against peace, but for a different reason. At that time we were losing. In effect there have been two wars, the one before February, 1965, which we lost, and the wider war which succeeded it and which, by sheer weight of air power, we are winning. To quit while we were behind would have been intolerable. To quit while we are ahead, while we are in a position to negotiate from strength, is almost as difficult. We lose enthusiasm for negotiation in proportion as the balance of military strength shifts to our side. The goal then becomes total victory, with little regard for what may follow.

The recession of peace as American force in Vietnam approaches the Korea level is accelerated by the fact that the Vietnamese, North and South alike, are only pawns in the game. The real, the important enemy in the American military viewpoint is Red China. Secretary Rusk made this plain in his speech of October 5 before a group of editors and publishers. From beginning to end, the address was a tirade against "Peiping" (as though he were a pre-World War II Japanese militarist, the Secretary cannot bring himself to say "Peking"), which was held solely to blame for all the trouble in Asia. Mr. Rusk was supplying the diplomatic justification for a build-up of American strength in Vietnam of enormous proportions. *U.S. News & World Report* (October 11) carries an article by staff correspondent K. M. Chrysler on the base at Cam Ranh Bay, 200 miles northeast of Saigon on the South China Sea, which is being converted into "the mightiest U.S. military complex in Asia." Cam Ranh used to be a fishing village. It will be one of the world's largest military harbors and supply centers. Warehouses containing nearly 4 million square feet of dry storage space are under construction. A tank farm for gasoline and oil storage, connecting pipe lines to a tidewater ammunition depot, and other elaborate—and permanent—installations are being built. The base will be operated by

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5,000 U.S. military personnel, who will be housed, fed and entertained in the usual American fashion of making war pleasant except for the actual moments of combat; and across the bay 2,000 South Vietnamese civilians will be quartered. More than 7,500 of our troops are there now, working around the clock, and a few miles to the north a private contractor is building what will be the biggest air base in the Far East. If anyone thinks that these gigantic operations, which are going on at a number of sites, are directed against the Vietcong, he is underestimating the prescience of Secretary McNamara, Gen. Maxwell Taylor and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Argentina's Friend

Once Robert S. McNamara sold automobiles, and he was very good at it. Now, in addition to his other duties, he sells arms, and he is just as good in that line. He has announced that since mid-1961 the United States has sold $9 billion worth of arms to free-world nations, and intends to keep up the pace indefinitely. The great peace-loving power of the West used to give away arms; now, with McNamara in charge, it sells them. Give or sell, the result is the same, as witness the outburst in Kashmir.

Mr. McNamara justifies America's role as a merchant of death—in the quaint phrase of the thirties—*on the ground that since 1961 it has brought nearly* a billion dollars of profit to American industry, and eased the balance-of-payments problem by some $5 billion. This is the economic side of it, but of course McNamara always has a moral reason for what he does. In this case the arms exports buttress the free world's defenses against communism. These defenses are internal as well as external; that is, the free nations must not only be in a position to fight Communist nations (or other free nations) but they must also be well armed against any of their own citizens who may have revolutionary designs.

One of these grievously threatened nations is Argentina. Here McNamara saw to it that the Argentinian generals got a real bargain. The French were trying to sell them Mirage jet bombers, which are rock bottom at $600,000 apiece. Instead, Argentina will receive fifty A4-B Douglas jet attack planes at about $250,000 each, a saving of more than $7 million which, conditions in Argentina being what they are, is no small consideration.

Of course critics who lack Mr. McNamara's inside knowledge and solicitude for the strength of the free world may ask why Argentina needs these aircraft at all. Who threatens Argentina? Red China, perhaps, or Ecuador? Neither seems very plausible, nor does any other probable enemy arise, yet we know there must be one, since Mr. McNamara surely would not be pushing these aircraft if there were nobody to shoot at. There *is* somebody, however, and Jack Scott, the Latin American correspondent of the *Toronto Star*, has discovered who it is.

Argentina, to no one's surprise, is to be saved from communism once again, and once again by the army, navy and air force. A military coup is in preparation by the armed forces, supported by business groups, industrialists and, says Scott, right-wing elements of the Catholic Church, who have evidently not heard Pope Paul's plea for peace. A 55-year-old retired army general, Edgar J. Landa, has been designated as the savior. "The majority of our citizens," he announces, "are clamoring for a dictatorship in the hope that it will impose order, discipline and morality." And, of course, prevent a Communist take-over. In General Landa's book, President Arturo Ilia is little better than a Communist, while his predecessor, Arturo Frondizi, was an authentic Communist. Nor is there any significant difference between Communists and the "radical-liberal element."

What are we to conclude? Obviously, that Argentina, or at least the upper crust there, has no better friend than Robert McNamara. And the same goes for the American arms manufacturer.

The Real Conflict

We trust that Roger Stevens will soon be relieved of Congressional harassment on the ground that his former activities as a theatre producer suggest a conflict of interest with his present position as Chairman of the National Council on the Arts. The notion that Mr. Stevens would somehow use his government position to assist the fortunes of productions in which he had an investment is ludicrous. The Stevens reputation is based precisely on the fact that the shows he chooses to back become bonanzas; he need scarcely resort to malfeasance to support the tottering fortunes of such properties as *West Side Story, Mary, Mary* or *Cat on a Hot Tin Roof*.

The reason (beyond simple justice) for relieving Mr. Stevens of this suspicion is that his appointment involves a different conflict with the public interest, which the question of financial probity obscures. The Council on the Arts was established, after many years of struggle, because of a growing dissatisfaction with the quality of art that is nourished by our commercial enterprises, and particularly by our commercial theatre. Problems of the market place, it was thought, have stunted America's aesthetic vigor. If those were removed, its art would flourish.

Granted, this is a theory, and the Council is an experiment. But it is an experiment handicapped from the start by the fact that President Johnson has seen fit to place at its head a man whose professional life has been shaped by the very situation the Council is designed to relieve. Roger Stevens is the symbol of Broadway success; his world is that of the box office, the weekly gross, movie rights and the biggest names in the brightest lights. He is good at his job, and he has given playgoers some excellent evenings in the theatre. But it is inconceivable that he is the best man available to free art from the shackles of commerce. To Roger Stevens, commerce is no shackle; it is the backbone of his life's work.

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Civil War on Madison Avenue

"You must know," said the speaker, ". . . that among educated Americans, and particularly among today's college students, advertising is highly suspect; its excesses have made it so; and there is no indication that there is the slightest effort being made currently on the part of the guilty advertisers to curb these." It was not some black-hearted enemy of the advertising industry who made this charge but one of its brightest luminaries—Fairfax M. Cone, chairman of the executive committee of Foote, Cone & Belding—and he was speaking not to some assemblage of eggheads, but to the Chicago chapter of the Public Relations Society of America. Mr. Cone is one of those admen who, without conspicuous success, have tried to prevent their colleagues from killing the goose that lays the golden eggs. The goose is killed in two ways. One is by preposterous claims that leave a trail of disillusionment; the other, which perturbs Mr. Cone and other sages of the industry even more, is an increasing tendency to disparage the competition.

It has been a rule of decorum in modern advertising that, though you may puff up your product to the bursting point, you must not openly attack a rival product. If once the ad profession started on that path, what scandalous revelations might not be laid before a still partially trusting public? And besides, how impolitic to run down the product of another agency's client when, with all his frailties, he may be your client next month.

This prudent policy has in fact been incorporated in the codes which guide the ethical adman. Since the client who foots the bills has something to say about such matters, and the adman's ethics are perforce subject to some modification by the practical demands of business, these commandments are a little vague in their wording. Section 10 (6) of the National Association of Broadcasters TV code, for instance, says that advertising copy "should contain no claims dealing unfairly with competitors, competitive products or other industries, professions or institutions." But what is unfair? For years the gas and oil interests, and lately the electric utilities as well, have been disparaging one another's products in the home heating markets. By claiming that gas is clean, for instance, the advertiser implies that oil is dirty; by urging the customer to "move up to electric heat" the advertiser implies that if the customer selects either of the other fuels he is buying a backward technology and degrading his family's social status. However, the oil, gas and electric interests have not, for the most part, named the allegedly inferior fuel.

This gentlemanly restraint is now vanishing. A Western distributor of Renault cars has been picturing Renault running circles around Volkswagen. American Motors intends to employ a "friendly giant killer" theme in an upcoming campaign and to name General Motors, Ford and Chrysler. A Gillette TV commercial displays Personna, Schick and Wilkinson blades—not, one may be sure, to the disadvantage of Gillette. Procter & Gamble claims that its Safegard soap will deodorize the user better than the "leading deodorant soap," which everybody in the anti-body-odor industry knows is Armour's Dial, incidentally handled by Foote, Cone & Belding.

All these campaigns Mr. Cone deplores in a tone of moral indignation, but he rests his case on the argument that overt disparagement in advertising will be bad for business. Perhaps so, but what about the public? When advertisers fall out, isn't it possible that honest men will get valuable information? Mr. Cone concedes that some advertising is outrageous, an insult to the intelligent buyer. One would expect that in this sector the bloodiest battles will be fought. The good guys will be separated from the bad guys, and the gullible section of the public may begin to see that a lot of advertising is plain imposture.

The Nuclear Club

WHY THE OUTS WANT IN . . . . Milton Viorst

Washington

There was surely oversimplification, if not a touch of hyprocrisy, in President Johnson's statement last August that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the "gravest of all unresolved human issues." It is not the spread but the use of nuclear weapons that can wipe out the world; and while the United States has been pious in the cause of limiting nuclear spread, it has been strangely silent on the subject of limiting nuclear use.

By ignoring the problem of nuclear use, the treaty on proliferation proposed by the American representatives at the disarmament conference in Geneva would affect only the nonnuclear powers. It contains no suggestion that halting nuclear proliferation might somehow be linked to restraining nuclear use. The American proposal, said the President, "demonstrates that a treaty can be drawn which meets the legitimate interests of nuclear and nonnuclear powers alike," but to an outsider the draft treaty looks like an offer by one state to give away the prerogatives of others. It could have no conceivable impact on American policies and practices. There is little reason for surprise, then, that the President's statement, along with the proposal itself, was received around the world with stony silence.

By proposing limitations on proliferation before reaching agree-

Milton Viorst is the author of Hostile Allies: FDR and De Gaulle (*Macmillan*). *He is currently working on* The Decline and Fall of the Republican Party.

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ment on use, the United States puts the cart before the horse. If the nuclear powers could agree upon terms governing the use of their weapons, the nonnuclear powers would be relieved of much of the incentive for joining the nuclear club. The United States, however, has shown no inclination to make any agreement that would replace total anarchy with a set of rules, even very limited rules. As long as Washington persists in this position, it seems delusive to believe that other nations of the world will voluntarily forswear all opportunity for nuclear weaponry.

The American differences with France illustrate most vividly the national confusion of cause and effect on the subject of nuclear proliferation. Sen. John Pastore of Rhode Island, commenting on Sen. Robert Kennedy's June speech on proliferation, declared that "much of our trouble with de Gaulle today is due to the fact that he is trying to become a prominent member of the nuclear club." But Pastore had the situation precisely reversed. De Gaulle is trying to become a prominent member of the nuclear club because we have had trouble with him. He wants his own nuclear force because French and American interests in certain vital areas are so different that he feels unable to depend on American weapons when he thinks France may need them.

As Pastore's statement indicates, America attributes de Gaulle's position to an excess of French nationalist ardor, to a quest for national prestige. It finds no merit in France's reluctance to put its fate in American hands. It regards as unreasonable the French Government's demands to make—or, at least, to share fully in making—its own life-and-death decisions. It recognizes no legitimacy to the argument that a nation cannot surrender to another nation the power to determine its own interests. Americans largely believe that a country need only rely on the United States to be assured of security. De Gaulle does not so much doubt America's integrity as its willingness to violate its own national interests when those of France are at stake.

The draft treaty submitted at Geneva says nothing about American guarantees to the nonnuclear powers. Senator Kennedy proposed that the United States put all countries which agree to withdraw from the nuclear race under an American "nuclear umbrella." Kennedy would have the United States say to the nonnuclear states: "You give up your right to acquire your own nuclear weapons and we will take care of you with ours." But Ambassador Goldberg, in a speech to the UN on September 23, did not go nearly that far. He promised simply that the United States would support the General Assembly in devising means to prevent nuclear blackmail. Goldberg's statement seemed to make quite clear that the United States is not willing to mortgage its own security in return for another government's consent to forswear nuclear arms.

But assuming American adoption, at some future date, of the Kennedy concept of a "nuclear umbrella," there is no certainty that it would attract the nonnuclear powers. Kennedy stipulated American guarantees would apply only to cases of "nuclear aggression." He declared that "such an umbrella . . . must be divorced from and superior to the other policy aims of the nations involved." But how can a sovereign, self-respecting nation accept a control over its fate that is "divorced from and superior to" its policy aims? One of its policy aims might be to save itself from nuclear blackmail, such as Hitler, for example, practiced with less sophisticated instruments on the Czechs in 1938. Another of its policy aims might be to save itself from a force that is not armed with nuclear weapons but otherwise vastly superior. Under such circumstances, would the American "nuclear umbrella" be of any service? Presumably, it would be up to the United States to decide. The very premise of the American proposal is that the United States is morally and intellectually, as well as militarily, competent to look after the well-being of the rest of the world. The rest of the world is not persuaded that the premise is valid.

India is a classic example of a country that is not unfriendly to the United States, has philosophical objections to nuclear weapons, does not want to go to the expense of building or buying them, but might, nonetheless, be forced by considerations of national security to seek membership in the nuclear club. Under an American "nuclear umbrella," India would be reasonably certain that the United States would retaliate in kind if Communist China exploded a nuclear bomb over New Delhi. But if Chinese hordes—to say nothing of Pakistanis—begin pouring over the frontier, the United States will not start a nuclear war in India's defense. Since the recent border fighting, domestic pressure on the Shastri government to initiate a nuclear-weapons program has been almost irresistible. India's dilemma illustrates the problem of the nuclear bomb as deterrent against "conventional" war. India would feel far more secure against Chinese attack, nuclear or nonnuclear, if it had its own nuclear weapons to rattle. They would have far greater general utility than any conceivable American guarantee.

The situation governing the defense of Western Europe is at once more simple and more complicated. It is more simple because the United States has already pledged itself under the NATO treaty to defend Western Europe, with nuclear weapons if necessary. But it is complicated by American statements on strategic planning which suggest that the response to a nonnuclear Soviet attack would be a nonnuclear defense. After twenty years of peace and prosperity, Western Europe appears less than satisfied with this arrangement. France and Germany, the countries best able to influence strategy, see little generosity in America's willingness to save the world — and the United States — from nuclear destruction by submitting Europe to "conventional" destruction. They indicate that they would rather gamble on a lightning nuclear war than acquiesce in an extended bloodletting such as they suffered in the two most recent conflicts. De Gaulle's *force de frappe* strategy is founded on this gamble. To many Europeans, a nuclear arsenal is more important as a deterrent to conventional than to nuclear war.

The Western European situation is further complicated by Bonn's interest in German reunification, which is, presumably, the most important of its "policy aims." In the past, Germany has indicated that it would not seek nuclear weapons in order to achieve it; more recently, government officials have said

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that Germany would agree to remain a nonnuclear power only if tangible progress was made toward reunification. Since de Gaulle undertook his nuclear-weapons program, the United States has accepted the view that Germany could not be kept indefinitely in a state of nuclear inferiority. To forestall a national nuclear force, Washington invented the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF). It was designed to give Germany some theoretical access to nuclear decisions but would, in reality, retain American control. Nevertheless, MLF has become the Russians' bête noire; they see in it a German finger on the NATO nuclear trigger. The Germans are willing to accept the MLF compromise but other major powers in NATO are not. Meanwhile, Bonn recognizes the anxiety it can create and has quietly begun a game of nuclear blackmail with the avowed aim of unifying Germany.

India and West Germany are two of the twelve countries named in a 1960 study as being capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons. Two of the remaining ten countries—France and China—have already become members of the club. All that they needed was an incentive to make the effort. The Israelis, whose incentive is defense against the Arabs, may have the capacity and may be using it. The Swiss, in a 1962 referendum, instructed their government not to make an anti-nuclear pledge. Indonesia's Sukarno insists, in the face of much skepticism, that his country will explode a nuclear device by the end of the year. The United States may invoke the virtue of abstinence in perfect sincerity, but as matters stand it has little chance of talking countries such as these out of manufacturing their own bombs.

The United States is awkwardly placed to mount an anti-proliferation campaign because of its own use of the nuclear threat. A country that will not accept temperance for itself can scarcely urge prohibition on others. The United States has never gone even as far as China or Russia in swearing never to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Washington has never consented to any of the nuclear inhibitions that it now asks others to accept.

On its own, the United States brought the world to the threshold of nuclear war during the Cuban crisis of 1962. It was, to be sure, severely provoked by the Soviet Union. Perhaps Russia was even guilty, by some definition, of that "nuclear aggression" which Senator Kennedy regards as justifying a nuclear response. Still, it was President Kennedy's decision, made unilaterally, that the Soviet missiles upset the international balance of power. Many who were friends of the United States thought, even while backing Kennedy, that the missiles merely subjected this country to the same dangers that its allies had long experienced. Kennedy's decision, while it may have been correct for the entire West, was made in the national interest of the United States. As Sorensen wrote, President Kennedy had determined upon "going ahead, regardless of how the allies reacted." Millions who live within range of hostile missiles had a right to wonder if the circumstances justified the risks to them.

The tacit American threat to employ nuclear weapons in Vietnam raises even more serious questions. There, the United States does not rattle its bombs openly. Instead, it declares a policy of escalation, then declines to renounce the nuclear ultimate in escalation. The American role in the Vietnamese war, unlike the Cuban crisis, has not won widespread sympathy. Washington's allies are, at best, cool to it, and the government cannot claim that it acts for the non-Communist world. "Nuclear aggression" is not involved. But the United States nonetheless employs the threat of nuclear war as an instrument of its own diplomacy. It can scarcely ask other countries to abjure such weapons while it makes use of their power, real or potential, for its own "policy aims."



Ben Roth Agency

The Soviet Union has already rejected the American draft treaty at Geneva, although Moscow opposes proliferation at least as strongly as does Washington. Since their first bomb was exploded shortly after World War II, the Russians have pursued a policy of sharing their knowledge of nuclear weaponry with no one. If they are angry about the American draft, it is not because they object to its goals but because they mistrust its proponent, who has left in its provisions a conspicuous loophole to permit Germany and other NATO countries to participate in a Multilateral Force.

The remaining nuclear powers appear to bring somewhat different approaches to Washington's draft treaty. Great Britain is as committed as the United States and the Soviet Union to restricting membership in the nuclear club, but it is not convinced that it

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should replace its own nuclear force with that of MLF. The French and the Chinese claim no aversion to proliferation as acute as that of the other nuclear powers. Neither, of course, signed the test-ban treaty. However, there is no evidence that either France or China has provided information on nuclear weaponry to any would-be nuclear powers. It is conceivable, though not considered likely, that Peking is somehow behind Sukarno's nuclear boasts. It is far more probable that all five nuclear powers want to halt nuclear spread, even if they cannot, for various political reasons, agree on a treaty that would ban the dissemination of weapons technology.

More than any other, it is the nonnuclear powers—friendly, neutral and enemy—that stand in the way of an anti-proliferation treaty. What the United States has asked them to accept at Geneva is not a bargain, in which some *quid pro quo* would be involved, but a self-denying ordinance. It is true that these same nonnuclear powers voluntarily limited their capacity to develop weapons by signing the test-ban treaty in 1962. But under that treaty, it was not they alone who accepted limitations. All the signatories, nuclear and nonnuclear, agreed to refrain from further tests in the atmosphere. The treaty not only retarded weapons development among the signers but saved the atmosphere from further fallout. The draft treaty on proliferation burdens only one group of signers, without any demonstrable benefit to all.

Goldberg sketched areas in the September 23 speech on which the United States might be willing to compromise. In terms hedged with limitations, he avowed that the United States was interested in freezing the manufacture of delivery vehicles, halting the production of fissionable materials for weapons use and dismantling, on a one-for-one basis with the Soviet Union, a reasonable number of nuclear weapons. Goldberg sounded pious enough but it is no secret that the United States is already far ahead of the rest of the world—the Soviet Union possibly excepted—in its stockpile of delivery vehicles and fissionable materials. As for the weapons themselves, even the Pentagon acknowledges the possession of a substantial "overkill" capacity. Once again, the nonnuclear powers might legitimately ask of the American overtures, what's in it for them?

It is not impossible to think of concessions that the nuclear powers might offer to make an anti-proliferation treaty more palatable to the nonnuclear powers. The concessions, presumably, would have to take the form either of increasing the access of nonnuclear powers or decreasing the access of nuclear powers to existing nuclear arsenals. Certainly no agreement can be completely satisfactory to all nations and probably none can be devised that might not, under certain circumstances, actually increase the chances of war. Nuclear weapons are credited by some with having thus far prevented World War III. They may, at this point, be more a mixed blessing than an unmitigated curse. Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine a riskier way to preserve civilization than to place bets on its obliteration. Few sane citizens of the earth would not feel safer if agreement could be reached for reducing the possibilities of nuclear war. Few believe that the present anarchic system is the best that can be devised.

The nuclear powers could, of course, go all the way and agree to scrap their bombs. Nuclear disarmament, quite apart from general disarmament, would certainly make a persuasive argument against proliferation. It may ultimately prove to be the only argument. But would the Western powers, fearful of being outnumbered by the Eastern hordes, ever agree to surrender their most potent defense? A strong argument could be made that the nuclear weapon is the West's last line of defense. Even if the argument is refuted, the mutual distrust of the nuclear powers appears to preclude any meaningful disarmament agreement in the predictable future.

As an alternative concession, the United States could make some provision to extend the concept of the "nuclear umbrella" to the very "policy aims" that Senator Kennedy would divorce from it. The institutional technique would, at best, be complicated. It would require that a mechanism be established by which potential nuclear powers could influence decisions that affect their fate. There must, of course, be safeguards against the deployment of nuclear weapons for "policy aims" that are in any way aggressive, but countries such as India or Israel must be permitted to share in decisions on which their defense depends. Such countries might agree to step under an American "nuclear umbrella," if they could be assured that the United States would not walk off to leave them standing in the rain.

The institutional mechanism could take a variety of forms. The nonnuclear power might make a bilateral arrangement with the United States, the Soviet Union or, conceivably, both. A multilateral system might be devised, within or apart from existing diplomatic instrumentalities. Careful organization and established rules could avoid the paralysis that consultation normally generates. Above all, the mechanism must provide the means whereby a nonnuclear power need not throw itself upon the mercy of a nuclear power if it believes that a threat to its integrity requires some sort of nuclear response. The way must be open for a government to plead its national interest prior to any nuclear decision.

Perhaps Moscow's deep hostility to MLF signifies that any arrangement to "democratize" nuclear decisions will be regarded as a form of proliferation. The Soviet fear is not groundless, but a carefully constructed mechanism need not mean more fingers to pull the trigger; it could mean more fingers to stop it from being pulled. At its best, such an arrangement could produce a greater spread of the nuclear veto.

The system would, necessarily, deprive the United States of complete nuclear independence. On its own, the United States would no longer be free to drop a bomb, whether in the defense of Europe or South Vietnam. In more practical terms, Washington would be required to give up the threat of nuclear war as an instrument of national diplomacy. But this would probably be the most convincing demonstration it could make.

Still another alternative available to the nuclear powers to retard proliferation would be to limit the use of their weapons to certain very specific circumstances. The least that the nuclear powers could give, in return for an anti-proliferation agreement from a nonnuclear power, would be a pledge never to

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use nuclear weapons on that power. Each of the nuclear powers could go a step further in the cause of non-proliferation by pledging to refrain from being first to use their bombs. These pledges would have the overwhelming advantage of simplicity. They would require no inspection. They would not impose disarmament on suspicious nuclear powers. To be sure, they would not satisfy a nonnuclear power that looked to nuclear weapons as deterrents to conventional attack, but they would reduce the nuclear have-not's fear of nuclear neighbors and thereby eliminate a strong incentive to proliferation. Such pledges would have the additional advantage of applying to weapons that already exist and not simply to those which might exist at some uncertain time in the future.

It is clear, above all, that the current system possesses the very lively dangers of both nuclear proliferation and nuclear use. "The threat to peace—and to human life itself"—said President Johnson, in submitting his treaty, "is universal. If the response is universal, the threat can be met." But the draft treaty that he proposed represents no significant step to meet that threat. Surely the United States can come up with a plan that is not so singularly self-serving, that contains some suggestion of understanding, that will genuinely reduce the possibility of nuclear war. The seriousness of the situation demands further reflection.

NEW CURRICULUM FOR TEACH-INS

Christopher Lasch

The organizers of the teach-in movement, most of them professors at the University of Michigan, still seem a little dazed by their unexpected and almost inadvertent success. They tell you with a mixture of pride and uneasiness that teach-ins have been held, in imitation of the one at Michigan, in England, in Australia, in Japan, in South Vietnam itself. At the same time they give the impression of shrinking back from some of the implications of the position into which events have thrust them. They talk about the need to move on from "mere" criticism to "constructive suggestions," as if they were groping toward a more acceptable posture than that of moral outrage, a posture which would not expose them to the charge of being fuzzy-minded idealists who know nothing of the complicated issues involved in Vietnam; a posture, moreover, more consistent with the academic self-image. Protest, accordingly, gives way to the "study group" earnestly searching for "alternatives." Specifically, on September 14-18 at Ann Arbor (scene of the first teach-in last March), it gave way to an international conference on "alternative perspectives on Vietnam."

The teach-in movement has been divided from the start between those on the one hand who see themselves as protestants and who wish to broaden the base of protest by reaching out to the student community and the civil rights movement, and those on the other hand who see themselves essentially as expert advisers to the government. The desire for a "confrontation" with McGeorge Bundy, which was finally consummated last summer in a televised debate between Bundy and Hans J. Morgenthau, is a good example of the latter line of thinking. The failure of the televised debate gave point to the objection of a minority within the teach-in movement: that debates with the government inevitably take place on the government's ground and degenerate into quibbles among experts about the facts of the situation in Vietnam, thereby blunting the moral issue raised by American involvement and by the progressive enlargement of the war. In their call for the Ann Arbor conference, the Michigan group appeared to have made certain concessions to the protestants within the movement. They spoke of the importance of the moral issue and held out the promise that "by approaching these questions from the moral perspectives of all great religious and philosophical systems, we may find solutions that are more consistent with fundamental human values than current American policy in Vietnam has turned out to be." They also expressed the hope that by making the teach-in movement genuinely international—the Ann Arbor meeting stressed its international character—they could "approach American policy from fundamentally different perspectives." These statements seemed to imply that the conference would devote itself not so much to finding specific alternatives in Vietnam as to looking at America itself—American foreign policy in general, and beyond that, the society of which it is an expression—from perspectives which transcend the American "consensus."

Judged in the light of these expectations, the conference was a disappointment. Several "study groups" met in closed sessions for three days and then reported the results of their labors in a public session in Hill auditorium, a cavernous place in which a large audience—mostly Michigan students—sweltered patiently in unseasonable September heat. After the reports, the meeting, with two hours out for dinner, heard a succession of speeches, ending, late in the evening, with an address by Arthur Miller. The conference then broke up—in accordance with the "Michigan teach-in tradition," we were told—into a number of simultaneous seminars, each running far into the night. The next and final day was devoted to "action workshops" charged with generating specific proposals for protest and/or "confronting" the government. There were a few bright spots in this lengthy program, but the general effect was dreary. Indeed, the terminology itself, together with the appeal to the "teach-in tradition," suggests that spontaneity has already given way to a certain amount of bureaucratization — inevitable,

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perhaps, in any organization, but depressing nevertheless.

The "alternatives" generated within the "study groups" struck one as platitudinous. "We examined the assumption," one group reported, "that threats are more effective [in reaching some kind of settlement in Vietnam] than positive incentives." After painful consideration, the group had decided that incentives were more effective than threats. Too much of the discussion was on that level. Furthermore, too much of it turned on narrow questions of fact. Was the National Liberation Front representative of the popular will? Was it primarily a nationalist or a Communist movement? Did it practice terror? Was the terror employed by the other side worse than our own?

At the end of a long afternoon, Robert Parris, field secretary of SNCC, pointed out that this excessive preoccupation with facts defeats itself. For every fact on one side of the debate it is possible to produce facts on the other side; and the government, in any argument over facts, necessarily has the last word, since it can claim to have more facts than its critics. The debate over Vietnam, Parris argued, should revolve not around facts but around theory—the theory, for instance, that American atrocities in Vietnam are not chance violence but part and parcel of a criminal war. Theories, he said—the theory of racism in the South, the theory of American benevolence in Asia—are notably resistant to change. They can absorb contrary facts and explain them away. Theories must be confronted with theories. The theory of American benevolence must be confronted with the theory of the dirty war (and beyond that, I would argue, with a theory about the cold war in general, in which the whole myth of American benevolence would be tested against the theory that Americans are not exempt from the corrupting influence of great power). One of the most puzzling features of the teach-in movement, however, remains its unwillingness to open up a larger debate about American foreign policy. On the contrary, the sponsors of the movement argue that it is useless to debate the larger issue until the war in Vietnam is brought to an end.

What can be done, then, to bring it to an end? The assumption of the teach-ins seems to be that the government must be persuaded, by a combination of argument and orderly demonstration, to end the war. It must be made to see that other alternatives exist, that it is possible to negotiate a settlement, that the North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front are ready to negotiate. But what if the government chooses to remain deaf to such appeals? We have been told that at least one approach from North Vietnam was rejected by the Johnson Administration because it came during the Goldwater campaign, and Johnson was afraid to appear before the voters as an "appeaser." I did not hear a single reference, during the entire conference in Ann Arbor, to the domestic political implications of a settlement in Vietnam. I heard many references to the fact that France had been able to withdraw from Algeria without losing its international prestige, but no one pointed out the obvious differences between the French case and the American.

France was able to remove itself from Algeria because a national hero coupled withdrawal with an appeal to glory; and even then, de Gaulle found it necessary to suppress the opposition by force and to impose on the country a regime of repression which has not been lifted yet. Johnson is not a national hero, nor is he in a position to suppress the Republican Party; and his political vulnerability—the vulnerability of any Democratic President on cold-war issues—opens up the prospect that we may have to wait for a Republican President, another Eisenhower, to put an end to the war in Vietnam. (By that time there will be nothing left of Vietnam.) Appalling as this prospect is, it is one that critics of President Johnson would do well to take into account.

Those critics would do well, in short, to consider the possibility that no amount of persuasion will change the central fact of American politics—the fact that there is no opposition party, no political opposition at all to the rhetorical but enormously effective demand that we stand up to the Communists, resist "aggression," avoid another "Munich." Until the political complexion of the country is radically changed, the political liabilities of liquidating the cold war will continue to outweigh its advantages. As long as the appeal to anti-communism brings automatic and unfailing success, we shall continue to be faced with the phenomenon, superficially so hard to explain, of "liberal" Presidents who execute the policies of their most outspoken critics on the far Right. Things would be different if the American Left had not long ago committed itself to outdo the Right in its anti-Communist zeal; but once the Left itself accepted anti-communism as the *sine qua non* of political respectability, it became the prisoner of its own immediate success, surviving the postwar hysteria only to find that hysteria had become a permanent feature of the political scene.



These facts, so notably absent from the discussions at the University of Michigan, so indispensable to any consideration of American policy in Vietnam or anywhere else, explain why it is futile to reason with the present Administration, or indeed with any administration. The Administration cannot be persuaded, it has to be *forced* to change the direction of American policy. The real question which critics ought to be consider-

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ing is what kind of force promises the earliest success.

There would seem to be two possibilities, not necessarily incompatible but difficult to pursue at the same time. One is mass civil disobedience, the weapon of the civil rights movement; and it is interesting, in this connection, that Robert Parris and a few other leaders of the civil rights movement were present in Ann Arbor. One of them, Carlton Goodlett, editor of the San Francisco *Sun-Reporter*, cited the free-speech movement at Berkeley as an example of the possibilities of civil disobedience; and one could recall many such examples—beginning with the Montgomery bus boycott—from the civil rights struggle in the South. Whatever the moral implications of civil disobedience, whatever the importance of making a "witness" against arbitrary power, the essence of civil disobedience, as Goodlett tried to show, is coercion. By bringing the normal processes of government to a halt (as, for instance, when more arrests have to be made than the normal agencies of law enforcement can possibly handle), masses of demonstrators can sometimes force authority to yield on a given point. And mass civil disobedience is a tactic that conceivably might be used in the peace movement as well.

So far, civil disobedience in the peace movement has figured only in the form of isolated acts of conscience, possibly educative but hardly coercive. If civil disobedience were to be really effective, the movement would have to become much larger than it presently is. That is one of the difficulties in the way of using civil disobedience as an instrument of agitation against American foreign policy. The other difficulty is that the situations in which civil disobedience has been successful are not precisely analogous to the foreign-policy crisis. In the case of Montgomery and Berkeley, civil disobedience was effective because it could be used against local authorities who were fully implicated in the policies under dispute. Those policies—racial discrimination, free speech—were issues of national importance which nevertheless had a local dimension and a local impact. Questions of foreign policy, however, rarely present themselves as local issues; and even when they do, as in the case of the opening or closing of military installations which have local significance, so much of the ultimate power of decision lies in Washington that it is hard to bring nonviolent coercion to bear. Some people have been predicting for several months that the power of the civil rights movement will shortly make itself felt in the agitation for peace, but these predictions still seem to me somewhat unconvincing, because of the inherently different nature of the two issues.

The other alternative, the other means of forcing a change in American policy, is to build an effective opposition along traditional lines—

a body of opinion, translatable into votes, which will be resistant to cold-war clichés and skeptical of anti-Communist crusades. Communism has too long been an obsession of American politics; it is time some drastic therapy laid it to rest. I do not propose a direct assault on the radical Right or even on the Center. It is the anti-Communist Left which most needs to be purged of its obsession with the menace; for it was the failure of the Left, its failure to function as an opposition, which in the forties and fifties made possible the emergence of the "bipartisan" foreign policy from which we still suffer. Even now the political climate is beginning to change, for a new generation is emerging for whom the trauma of Stalinism is a dead issue. But older liberals, with their tremendous emotional investment in the disappointments of the past, assume toward the new generation an irritating condescension, and assure them that they will live to suffer the same disappointments and learn the same bitter lessons about the incompatibility of freedom and revolution. The new Left, in reply, denounces the old as "irrelevant"—the fate of all middle-aged people in America. The generational split on the Left thus mirrors a deeper sickness of American life, the absolute discontinuity between youth and age; and to attack the problem at the political level might suggest the possibility of attacking it at other levels as well.

The importance of the generational issue is what made the device of the "teach-in" initially so suggestive as a technique of agitation. Teach-ins represent precisely the mingling of age groups which has to occur before an effective Left can take shape—for the students alone do not constitute an opposition, whatever some of them may say about the irrelevance of their elders. Unfortunately, the very political crisis which created the teach-ins—the war in Southeast Asia—prevents them from becoming an effective instrument either of opposition or of education; the leaders of the movement have subordinated everything to the effort to stop the war in Vietnam. Quite apart from everything else, stopping the war in Vietnam is not a subject worth "teaching." It has very little intellectual content; a certain number of points can be made, and the subject is quickly exhausted. The real subject that needs to be "taught" is the history of the cold war and of the relation of the American Left to communism. The Left needs to reconsider its own history, as a patient therapeutically reconstructs his past. It needs to reconsider the origins of the cold war; it needs to reconsider what it means to have "chosen" the West; it needs to reconsider Stalinism itself—was it an aberration or a historical necessity?—in order to get some perspective on the history of the 20th-century revolution.

These are subjects, as distinguished from "alternatives" in Vietnam, worth teaching. Until the "teach-ins" begin to teach, they will be politically useless and intellectually boring. It will be interesting to see whether the failures of higher education—the confusion of education with expertise, the idea that students are a needless obstacle to "research"—will now repeat themselves in the political agitation to which teachers find themselves so unexpectedly committed.

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Atomic Insurance

The Ticklish Statistics . . . . . David E. Pesonen

San Francisco

There exists considerable evidence that the Atomic Energy Commission, under pressure from the private utility industry and the manufacturers of nuclear reactors, has recently suppressed a report that could profoundly affect the course of the atomic power industry. The report deals with the theoretical consequences of a major accident in a large nuclear power plant.

In 1954 Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act "in the hope and belief that the substantial entry of private industry into the atomic energy program would speed the further development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. . . . " However, industry was discouragingly slow in the development and installation of large nuclear power plants, and the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) initiated an inquiry into the causes of the delay. It found that "the problem of potential liability and the inability to obtain adequate insurance from commercial sources in connection with the operation of nuclear reactors constituted a major obstacle to further private industrial participation in this program. . . . "

The JCAE requested the AEC's Brookhaven National Laboratory to study more precisely what the effects of a major accident would be. The resulting report has come to be called the Brookhaven Report; its official title is WASH-740. Released in limited supply in 1957, it has become widely available, over the intervening years, mostly by word of mouth and Xerox machine.

The Brookhaven Report laid great stress on the low probability of a major accident. (Six months after its release, the infamous Windscale incident occurred in England. Some experts believe that evidence from Windscale, which resulted in heavy radioiodine (I-131) fallout, has "changed the parameters" of the original Brookhaven Report.) Despite the small chances of a big accident, the report concluded that the consequences of such an occurrence would be catastrophic — far beyond normal industrial experience or ability to indemnify: 3,400 fatalities, 43,000 radiation injuries, $7 billion property damage spread over an area of 150,000 square miles.

Consequently, the JCAE drafted, and Congress passed on September 2, 1957, the so-called Price-Anderson Indemnity Act. The basic provisions of the act were: (1) the federal government assumed liability for major nuclear accidents, up to the amount of $500 million; (2) reactor owners were required to obtain an additional $60 million coverage from one of several special syndicates of private insurance companies; (3) a ceiling of $560 million was placed on public liability. If claims by survivors exceeded that amount, the total coverage was to be parceled out to claimants on a pro rata basis. The legal and procedural machinery for so massive and tragic a cutting of the pie are far from clear.

In recommending passage of the act, the JCAE reported:

> *The provisions of this bill provide governmental indemnification to those licensees who obtain their licenses* [from the AEC] *within the next 10 years. The indemnification agreement is to run for the life of the license. During the 10-year period* it is hoped that there will be enough experience gained so that the problems of reactor safety will be to a great extent solved *and the insurance people will have had the experience on which to base a sound program of their own.*

The act was to remain in effect for ten years, at which time the committee would review its effectiveness.

As the expiration date of the first Price-Anderson Act approached (August 1, 1967), the utility industry, the manufacturers of reactors, the AEC and the JCAE began preparing to extend it for another ten years. The AEC reported to the committee this year that "it is possible to postulate extremely unlikely, theoretical nuclear accidents which, under certain circumstances, conceivably would cause damage considerably in excess of [the] $60 million [currently available from private sources]." And the JCAE in turn reported to the full Congress that:

> *The experience in this field is not yet sufficiently great nor the technology sufficiently developed, that it is possible to deny the theoretical possibility of such an accident. . . . Accordingly, the principal reason for enacting the Price-Anderson legislation—the need to assure the availability of funds for the payment of claims arising out of a catastrophic nuclear incident—still persists.*

In anticipation of hearings on the extension, the now seven-year-old original Brookhaven Report was scheduled to be updated, to take into account the increasing sophistication of reactor designs and protective measures, as well as the subsequent operating experience with reactors in existence in 1957, or built soon thereafter. The report was also to consider that reactors being planned today are both much larger and closer to population centers than those contemplated ten years ago. Whether these factors balance out in their effect on public safety would be of considerable interest to citizens who may soon face the prospect of having a large nuclear power plant in their vicinity.

There is some reason to believe that the factors do not balance—that today's reactors pose a more severe threat to public safety than was anticipated in the 1957 Brookhaven Report. At the February, 1965, meeting in Los Angeles of the American Nuclear Society, Clifford K. Beck, deputy director of regulation for the AEC, made the following remarks in an address on "Reactor Siting Criteria and Practice in the U.S.":

> *What is really troubling the nuclear community now in the siting of power reactors is the desire to move to a substantially different pattern for choosing reactor sites; at the same time major alterations and size increases in the reactors are taking place. . . . Pressures to*

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move reactors closer to load [population] *centers and nuclear technology at the same time has presented us with reactors of 5 times the power level and 3 or so times the fuel lifetime of reactors three years ago.*

Let me mention just one technical fact to point up the significance of the changes that are occurring. There is a very large difference in the implications of a major meltdown in a 3,000 MW [megawatt] *reactor as contrasted to that in a 300 MW reactor. For the small reactor, it may make good sense to surround it with a leak-proof, concrete "thermos bottle" containment, and, in case of accident, just walk away and let everything inside settle down and cool off. For the 3,000 MW reactor all the thermal phenomena inside are greatly increased in magnitude and accelerated in the rate of time-sequences. If you walk away from that "thermos bottle," its temperature curve, after perhaps a momentary decline, will rise continuously and will simply heat up until it bursts, so a reliable cooling system must be added.*

Thus, as reactors become larger and larger, as their fuel cycle lengthens, and as they are simultaneously moved toward population centers, the demand on the containment becomes much more exacting and the necessity of other systems working, besides just the containment vessels, becomes more urgent.

On December 3, 1964, at the annual meeting of the Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF), the principal trade association of the nuclear industry, AEC Commissioner John G. Palfrey delivered an address titled, "The Price-Anderson Law and Safety," which began as follows:

My assignment today was to review with you the updating of the Brookhaven report on the theoretical consequences of major nuclear accidents, and secondly, the AEC's report on extending the Price-Anderson Act. Well, the Brookhaven study is not ready yet and the Price-Anderson Report is still in draft form, and has not been reviewed by the Commission. . . .

I think I should beg off on the Brookhaven study because my guesses on what it will say or should say could be irresponsible chatter on a ticklish subject *that needs accurate reporting. All I will say is what you probably know, that seven years after the first study one is considering theoretically conceivable accidents in a reactor which is considerably larger than in 1957, located somewhat closer to population centers, with the confidence of increased operating experience and constantly improving design and engineered safeguards. My guess is—well, I just said I won't guess.* (Emphasis added.)

Attending this meeting in San Francisco was one Hal Stroube, atomic information specialist (i.e., in charge of public relations for atomic power plants) for the Pacific Gas and Electric Company, the nation's largest private utility. Stroube and his company were fresh from defeat in one of the bitterest battles in the company's sixty-year history, the battle of Bodega Bay. [See "Outrage on Bodega Head" by Gene Marine, *The Nation*, June 22, 1963.] On October 30, one month before the Atomic Industrial Forum conference, PG&E had abandoned plans to build a 325 MW atomic plant at Bodega Head, a scenic peninsula about 50 miles north of San Francisco. The AEC had expressed some doubt as to the safety of the reactor (it was on an earthquake fault) after the utility had already invested $4 million excavating the foundations. This humiliating development was a familiar topic of hallway discussion of the AIF meeting.

About three months later, in a conference on reactor siting of the American Nuclear Society, a professional association of reactor engineers, PG&E's Mr. Stroube advised the AEC on ways to make his job a little easier next time:

My task here, of course, is not to poke fun at the AEC, and I don't intend to do that. I have simply pointed out several areas which I believe they could consider improving in order to make it easier for us to get on with our chore of public understanding. One last suggestion along these lines would be to do us a great *big favor by* cancelling *the now-in-progress up-dating of the Brookhaven Report. I've eaten a steady diet of WASH-740 in the past three years as it became the bible of the anti-Bodega crowd, and no amount of pointing to the disclaimers in the three-page covering letter in the front of the report could overcome those chilling words. "3,400 people killed, 43,000 injuries, $7 billion in property damage" which rolled so glibly off their tongues from the depths of this theoretical study of the possible consequences of a major accident—and so forth. I agree with Mr. Lowenstein when he says that these figures are damaging when taken out of context, but simply putting them back* into *context as he suggests is about as easy as trying to unscramble an omelet and return it to its several shells.*

And at the end of the printed proceedings of this meeting (published by the AEC's Division of Technical Information), under the heading "Summary of Discussion," occurs the following paragraph:

Two more ideas were proposed as means of helping to gain public acceptance of nuclear power. One was the suggestion that the public be made aware of how the hazards of various industries and various other aspects of daily living compare with atomic energy experience. The other was that the planned updating of the Brookhaven report, WASH-740, be dropped. The opinion was expressed that the original report has already caused serious problems in gaining public support



Con Edison Nuclear Plant, Indian Point, N.Y.

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of nuclear power and that the revision would tend to begin a new cycle of problems.

The proceedings indicate no formal resolution requesting the AEC to abandon the Brookhaven revision; but both the ANS and the AIF are extremely powerful influences on the AEC and the Joint Committee. Indeed, many AEC personnel are members of the professional association, and the meetings of the trade association are studded with AEC participants.

However, in June, 1965, six months after AEC Commissioner Palfrey had told the AIF conference in San Francisco that the Brookhaven study "is still in draft form," JCAE Chairman Holifield wrote AEC Chairman Seaborg, and asked him to bring the committee up to date on (1) Price-Anderson indemnity, and (2) the Brookhaven Report. In his reply of June 18, Chairman Seaborg proceeded for two pages to skirt any mention of a specific *report* from the restudy of WASH-740. With studied vagueness he summarized the *findings*, in the following paragraph, which would seem to suggest that a report does exist somewhere in the closely guarded AEC catacombs:

> *In answer to the second question, a restudy of the theoretical consequences of hypothetical accidents by our staff and that of Brookhaven has led us to fairly predictable conclusions. Reactors today are much larger than those in prospect in 1957, their fuel cycles are longer and their fission product inventories are larger. Therefore, assuming the same kind of hypothetical accidents as those in the 1957 study,* the theoretically calculated damages would not be less and under some circumstances would be substantially more than the consequences reported in the earlier study. (Emphasis added.)

The computations required to arrive at these conclusions are quite complex, and Seaborg would have been unlikely to state them without a completed report to back him up.

All of these facts indicate that a restudy was begun of The Theoretical Possibilities and Consequences of Major Accidents in Large Nuclear Power Plants. Either the completed study or a preliminary version reached the following conclusions:

> (1) The chances for a major accident are low but greater than zero.
>
> (2) The consequences would be substantially greater than anticipated in 1957—i.e., greater than 3,400 fatalities, 43,000 radiation injuries, and $7 billion property damage.

But the mathematical conclusions of the new study—its chief reason for being—have been suppressed. Why? Is the utility industry's public relations "chore" the only explanation?

On June 22, 23 and 24, the JCAE held hearings on Price-Anderson extension. There were four witnesses from the AEC (including Commissioners Palfrey and Ramey) who supported the legislation (H.R. 8496). The "views of industry and the public" were given by two public witnesses (a former JCAE staff member, who supported the legislation, and a civil engineer from Madison, Wis., who opposed it) and twenty-one other witnesses in the following categories:

In favor—4 insurers of nuclear reactors
In favor—7 electric utilities or utility trade associations
In favor—7 reactor manufacturers or trade associations
Opposed—3 coal companies or coal trade associations

The motives of witnesses from coal companies and associations were naturally looked upon with some suspicion by the committee—a suspicion, one might add, that was not extended to witnesses from interests who supported the legislation. The coal industry has never exhibited a conspicuous concern for human welfare, but it appears that on this matter the self-interest of the coal industry coincides with the public interest. With respect to the elusive new Brookhaven Report, Joseph E. Moody, president of the National Coal Policy Conference, testified:

> *It is also rather curious to us that, with full knowledge that this hearing was coming up in this session of Congress, and that the Joint Committee was to consider this important piece of legislation, a little special effort on the part of the Brookhaven Laboratory people could not have produced their new, basic evaluation for determining potential damages in the event of a nuclear accident. . . .*
>
> *I have the impression that there are doubts as to whether the extension of Price-Anderson in its present form is, indeed, good for the nuclear power industry. In fact, it was stated that it tended to present a massive façade to the public indicating a lack of confidence on the part of Congress and, indeed, of the utilities themselves in the extremely complicated machines used to produce nuclear power.*
>
> *The alternative would be to take a strong positive approach and let Price-Anderson expire, which might well develop an industry guided and operated only by those who had confidence in it.*

The utility witnesses were unanimous that they would abandon plans to build nuclear power plants, unless the government indemnity were extended. Their argument was a curious one: although they were confident that atomic power plants were perfectly safe, and they wouldn't dream of risking the lives and property of their many good customers, nevertheless, *if* a big accident were to occur they would not like to bear the responsibility. And this consideration was great enough to be decisive in future choices between coal and nuclear fuels. The following exchange, for example, occurred during the testimony of George C. Kinsman, vice president of the Florida Power & Light Company:

> Representative Price: *If you felt that your company could not secure its construction permit before the expiration of the Price-Anderson Act of 1967, would you continue your interest in the building of an atomic power plant?*
>
> Mr. Kinsman: *That is a decision that I don't know that I can speak to entirely. I think our directors would take a very hard look before they went ahead, Mr. Price.*

And with an eye to the customers for their reactors, the manufacturers echoed the utilities' position. As Charles H. Weaver, vice president of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, testified:

> *There is no inconsistency between saying, on the one hand, that atomic power plants are safe for location in large cities and that, on the other hand, Price-Anderson protection should be extended. There is only recognition that some men continue to feel concern. If Price-Anderson were not extended, we might well encounter the argument in reverse; namely, that we cannot locate atomic power plants in large cities because there is no Price-Anderson protection.*
>
> Chairman Holifield: *In your opinion, what would be the effect of the delay until next year in acting*

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on the proposed Price-Anderson extension?

Mr. Weaver: *Mr. Chairman, I think the problem there is simply the longer you delay the more difficult it is for people to formulate their plans with any degree of finality. Particularly in the commercial area, the electric utility industry is certainly actively considering what they are to do. I would feel that they would question the desire to continue the development of atomic power to the extent we have indicated is our wish to date if we were not to act on this promptly, once having brought it to the table the way we have.*

It is hard to say what effect release of the new Brookhaven Report might have had on these hearings and subsequent Congressional debate. The Price-Anderson extension passed the Senate without debate and cleared the House on September 16 by a 337-to-30 vote. During the one-hour limited debate, several Appalachian states vainly raised constitutional objections to the ceiling on indemnity and objected to the unseemly haste in renewing the act two years before it expires. What might have been the vote had the AEC not withheld the new report indicating potential damages of perhaps $35 billion over 750,000 square miles? Only two Congressmen raised the old Brookhaven Report in House debate—and that just in passing. After all, the only figures they had to work with were more than seven years old.

In a speech to the Atomic Industrial Forum, in October, 1957, a month after the first Price-Anderson Act was passed, AEC Chairman Lewis L. Strauss made these points:

In line with the established, time-proven American tradition of free competition, as opposed to government control, and in conformity with both the letter and the spirit of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, we seek to bring about the development of nuclear power within the structure of private enterprise.

We seek to establish at the earliest feasible time, an independent nuclear power industry—independent in all its stages from concept to operation — independent from government domination or government subsidy.

The AEC has proved itself most dexterous in defining the term "subsidy," as its support of the Price-Anderson Act suggests. And it has also shown enthusiasm for suppressing information that might prove inimical to its objectives. Perhaps the most celebrated instance occurred in the so-called PRDC case. Faced with a lawsuit brought by the United Auto Workers, against the granting of a construction permit for a reactor to be constructed at Monroe, Mich., by the Power Reactor Development Company, the AEC suppressed a report that doubted the safety of the installation. The commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards had recommended that a permit for the plant be denied. Their report, forwarded to the commission on June 6, 1956, was immediately classified "Administratively Confidential." On August 4, 1956, the AEC granted a construction permit to PRDC to begin work on the reactor. Immediately thereafter, Chairman Strauss announced that he would attend the groundbreaking ceremonies and give a speech. But after word leaked on the confidential report, and after considerable pressure from the Joint Committee, the AEC released the adverse report in October. By that time, site preparation was well under way.

The evidence bearing on the latest updating of the Brookhaven Report strongly suggests that a comparable situation now exists with respect to Price-Anderson extension.

The 1957 Brookhaven Report has been a serious public relations liability in the promotion of nuclear power installations. For public relations reasons, as well as for legislative success in extending Price-Anderson, the AEC appears to have abandoned or suppressed the updated report—a major research project of potentially widespread public importance.

HOSPITALS WITHOUT NURSES . . Jean Martin

Mike Nichols and Elaine May have brought out a record in which they kid the medical profession on a variety of levels. On the last band, Mike and Elaine are in rehearsal, working up a new skit. Mike tells Elaine, "Be a Jewish mother"; and then, as a young son, he comes to her with the news that he has decided what profession he wants to enter. "It will take a lot of work, a lot of sacrifice on all our parts," he warns. But the mother is entranced by the prospect of this kind of suffering, for she has the burning ambition of all Jewish mothers: a son who is a "professional." "Mother," Mike confides to her, lowering his voice rhapsodically, "I have decided what I want to do with my life. I want to be a nurse." Whereupon the two comedians dissolve in laughter, this being after all only a rehearsal.

The skit is strangely prophetic, but the joke is ephemeral, for the same scene may soon be played in all seriousness. The United States now suffers a shortage of nurses so severe that an incredible number of good nursing positions are going begging. One-fifth of all hospital nursing jobs were vacant in 1962 (in the South it reached an unbelievable 50 per cent). And the first stumbling blocks to remedying the situation are the additional facts that in 1963, 58 per cent of those entrusted with training new nurses lacked graduate degrees considered essential for good teaching, and that 11 per cent of budgeted faculty positions were vacant. Yet if nursing is to keep up with the rise of hospitalization, it must increase by 75 per cent the number of registered nurses to meet the needs of 1970.

The new comprehensive insurance plans, plus the growing population with its rising percentage of old persons with long-term nursing needs, have made immense demands on nursing; the new complexities in the practice of medicine, the added responsibilities delegated to nurses because of the doctor shortage—all

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these have changed the pattern of the profession. But the salary—average $84.50 per week — has scarcely changed at all. If nursing schools can somehow induce 6 per cent of all high school girl graduates to enter the nursing profession, the supply of RNs will still reach only the minimum demand for 1970. It is considered desirable that nurses should provide 50 per cent of direct patient care in a hospital, but the highest goal realistically obtainable for 1970 (according to the Surgeon General's Consulting Group on Nursing) will provide only 38 per cent.

How does the nursing shortage make itself felt? While the situation has long been obvious to hospital officials, who often must close wards or reject patients because of a lack of nurses, it comes to public awareness as what appears to be hospital inefficiency. "I never see a nurse," says the patient, and the patient is the one who feels the shortage in terms of real, physical deprivation. The sick person, for example, who has an untrained aide instead of an RN attending him may experience a drug reaction that is not reported as speedily as it should be; he may go through a respiratory crisis which could be alleviated by the presence of better-trained help. Or, to take a more widespread example (somehow nursing lends itself to statistics, probably because it is the most studied and thoroughly documented of professions, and the statistics abound), there are 718,000 patients in psychiatric hospitals in this country, a number that exceeds all other hospitals combined. For these there are employed 16,300 nurses, 9,600 practical nurses, and 101,000 aides and orderlies, the nurses managing to deliver a bare 10 per cent of direct patient care as contrasted to the 30 per cent now being given in (also understaffed) general hospitals. For the psychiatric patient, whose need is not only for the tranquilizer but for the knowledge that the person giving it to him *cares* about him, this is tantamount to withholding medication. And a similar shortage of human sympathy exists on every level in every hospital and is felt by every patient, rich or poor. The resultant lessening of patient-nurse respect, compounded by the deterioration of doctor-nurse respect (the doctor shortage has resulted in a blurring of what a nurse should be expected to do or not do) has tainted the old Florence Nightingale-Clara Barton image. Nursing, which is fundamentally a "calling," has lost its greatest reward. For (as yet another study of nursing has indicated), contrary to all ideas that girls go into nursing to marry doctors or meet rich patients, the fact is that 80 per cent become nurses out of a desire to serve. But while nursing appeals to the humanistic emotions, nowadays it also requires a better than average mind. For admission to most nursing schools, the applicant must be in the upper third of her high school graduating class. Paradoxically, while the nursing shortage is severe, the lack of unsuitable applicants is not. And so strong is the "call" of the profession that these rejectees suffer deeply when they are turned down.

The applicant for nursing has a choice of training programs. She may get a degree from a college or a diploma from a hospital school. She then takes a state exam and, if pronounced "safe to practice," becomes an RN. There are also two-year programs which turn out "practical nurses," these in increasing numbers of recent years. And hospitals are employing a growing number of unskilled nurses' aides. But while the jump in the number of licensed practical nurses has been large, a considerable percentage work part time, and among the nurses' aides (who lack background and education) the turnover is enormous. The real need is for very highly trained nurses and for nurse educators. Fifty years ago a nurse did everything for her patients; her ward was one big bedroom. Now she is increasingly an executive who must decide which of her too-numerous patients may be entrusted to the practical nurse, which to the nurses' aide. The nurse today is entangled in mountains of paper work and a complex of drugs to be dispensed and kept track of—some hospitals are experimenting with IBM machines to release the nurse from this clerical activity and free her for human contacts. But somehow, amid all this growing complexity of duties, the RN manages to receive a salary somewhat less than that of the average secretary.

Lately, there has been some talk of a union for nurses, but most of the profession look askance at the suggestion. Most of the power for salary bargaining has already been removed by a standing agreement made tacitly between nurses and the states that the nurses will not strike. But raising the salary would at least bring back to the profession a number of married nurses who do not otherwise choose to return. Oddly enough, these married nurses tend to prefer the "lobster shifts," which are otherwise so difficult to fill. Also, salary increases and the addition of fringe benefits enjoyed by most other workers would attract to the profession older women ready to return to work, minority groups eager to get ahead, and (as some experts maintain) a greatly overlooked possibility—men.

While the number of nurses is traditionally tied to the number of teen-age girls, there are indications that men may begin entering the field. At present 40 per cent of nursing schools do not admit men, but they are changing with the profession. It is true that the word "nurse" is too deeply involved in feminine connotations to be applied with grace to men in hospital work, but with the shift in nursing duties, with the need for administrators and educators, men may come into nursing under other titles.

The young nowadays are not notably realistic in their goals—a striking example being the juvenile delinquent school dropout who confided in a TV interview that his ambition was to be a "nuclear physicist." Perhaps with some coaxing (a film narrated by Pat Boone is directed to high school boys and girls) teen-age boys may join teen-age girls as nursing candidates. At least, under the Surgeon General's Consultant Group on Nursing the size of the nursing shortage has been appraised, the nature of the problem realized—and diagnosis is half the cure.

Meanwhile, the profession looks for quick solutions: a Catholic hospital in Texas sent its nuns to Ireland with a color film about the hospital to recruit nurses for its staff; an air line offered to fly nurses in from the Philippines. But these solutions are deplored by responsible nursing leaders who know that the shortage is not only in this country, but everywhere in the world — including Russia, where they still keep babies in swaddling clothes.

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Teachers' Unions

RIFT WITHOUT DIFFERENCES . . . Stanley Elam

Suggest in a partisan group that education's two warring employee organizations should merge and you are likely to be hooted from the room. "Their outlook and programs are poles apart," it will be said. But this reply ignores the facts, some of which are recent developments.

Privately, leaders in both factions admit that rivalry between the American Federation of Teachers and the National Education Association must eventually end in merger or alliance. Too much money and energy are being wasted that might better be directed toward common goals, and bitterness is building up which can be exploited by the enemies of both groups for decades to comes. Michael Moskow, a labor economist with the Drexel Institute, says: "Merger will definitely occur, but probably not for about five years." He notes that already some NEA and AFT affiliates have made overtures for merger at the local level.

Until recently, the rivalry between the NEA and AFT may have served some useful purpose. For example, AFT successes, particularly in New York, forced the NEA to intensify its teacher-welfare efforts [see "Organizing the Teachers" by Stanley Elam, *The Nation*, June 29, 1964]. The Urban Project, which has promoted scores of "professional negotiations" agreements between local associations and boards of education, was a direct result of the concessions and written contract that AFT Local No. 2, the United Federation of Teachers (UFT), won from New York City's reluctant board. The state-wide sanctions program, so effective in Utah and now on trial in Oklahoma (a more difficult state) is the NEA's alternative to the strike, on which AFT locals depend as a last resort. Sanctions may involve a variety of actions by the local, state and national units: boycott, publicity, political action. Usually, after lengthy investigation, a school system will be declared "one where no professional person would want to seek employment." Depending on the loyalty of teachers to their organization, it can close a school—but only after teachers have met their contract obligations. Because the AFT has few effective state organizations, the NEA has been sponsoring legislation which favors state-wide professional negotiations as opposed to AFT-sponsored collective bargaining in Washington, Oregon, California and Connecticut. An aroused NEA can eventually dominate the teacher-welfare field everywhere except in the big cities—where, however, unionism is a way of life.

The AFT, suddenly aware that its membership is not growing as rapidly as hoped,* decided at its August convention in Los Angeles to emphasize state organization, research and publications. The new program will involve a considerable increase in dues, making them higher than the NEA's annual $10—and that will be one more point of similarity between the two bodies.

Are there real and important differences between the AFT and NEA? AFT rank and file, for example, are accused of being less devoted to the professional aspects of teaching. Not true, says William T. Lowe of Cornell, who cites the fact that AFT members are actually more likely than NEA members to belong to professional associations (the American Historical Association, the National Council of Teachers of English), even though these groups have a working relationship with the NEA.

The most easily recognizable difference between NEA and AFT members is that a significantly higher percentage of men than women join the AFT. Related to this fact, perhaps, is a difference in morale. AFT members tend to be dissatisfied, and would choose some other career if they could make the decision again. The single salary schedule is widely accepted in teaching, and a man can hardly support a family on the average salary of less than $6,000—at least not on the level college graduates and professionals have come to believe is their due. Thus they are activists and give the AFT its reputation for impatience and militancy. They are likely to be younger teachers at the junior-high and high-school levels, where men tend to concentrate in the public schools. (That, incidentally, is probably why many of them join professional organizations, which are more important for high school than for grade school teachers.)

AFT members, then, are the people who prefer a rapid and more or less clean solution of salary squabbles (the strike) to a slow, cumbersome and messy procedure (sanctions). But beyond this difference of attitude, what ideological, programmatic and structural differences between the NEA and AFT might prevent or delay merger? Only two are usually regarded as crucial.

First, within a month of its formation in 1916, the AFT became affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. It now pays AFL-CIO dues and makes much of the "mutual benefits of affiliation." NEA literature emphasizes the theme that by affiliation AFT teachers lose the independence of action that is important to professionals committed to objectivity and responsible to all the public. As NEA Executive Secretary William G. Carr puts it, "American teachers must remain free and independent of entangling alliances with any one group in society."

But what entanglements actually occur? In August, 1963, the UFT was on the verge of a strike in New York City. It was generating as much political pressure as possible against Mayor Wagner and the city administration. When Harry Van Arsdale, head of the Central Labor Council, threw his complete support behind the UFT, a settlement was reached which the union found acceptable. It didn't produce much money the first year, but it got some for the second. The questionable result, so far as the UFT is concerned, was the political debt contracted, for that debt is now being called. According to the New York *World-*

*Current AFT membership is about 110,000, up 50,000 from 1961 when the UFT won exclusive bargaining rights in New York City. Almost half this increase has been in New York City itself. Meanwhile, the NEA has grown from 714,000 to about 943,000.

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Telegram of April 17, the UFT as part of its annual contract proposals asked the New York City board to agree not to buy textbooks, teaching materials or equipment transported or handled by any company with which the AFL-CIO has a dispute. If this can be done, it is not fanciful to suppose that the AFT might, as the price of AFL-CIO support, be asked to boycott a textbook critical of a position the trade unions have taken in resisting new modes of production.

In the past two years the AFT and the NEA have locked horns in a series of big-city elections to choose exclusive bargaining agents. One of the first of these occurred in Milwaukee. At the time (early 1964) it was thought that direct intervention by the AFL-CIO would help the AFT cause; hence the election was not run by the AFT but by the director of organization for the AFL-CIO's Industrial Union Department. Walter Reuther, president of the IUD, made a personal visit just three days before the election on February 12. However, the Milwaukee Teachers' Education Association (MTEA) won by a 600-vote majority out of 4,012 votes cast. The MTEA campaign stressed independence for teachers and freedom from ties with organizations outside the profession. Clearly, teachers resented the AFL-CIO "invasion," and since the Milwaukee debacle the IUD has remained in the background of bargaining elections.

The experience of the organized profession in England and Canada is instructive on this point. In both countries, the leading teachers' organizations have passed through a stage of labor affiliation. The National Teachers Union in England dropped the connection some years ago. In Canada, where teacher groups are far stronger and more experienced in collective negotiations than in the United States, none is now affiliated, although at one time—before provincial groups became effective in themselves—they were in the national union movement. The reasons given are primarily economic: it is believed that the considerable sums once spent in affiliation fees can be used more effectively by the Canadian Teachers Federation itself.

It can be persuasively argued that should the nearly 2 million U.S. teachers band together, their economic strength would be such that the disadvantages of affiliation with organized labor would far outweigh the advantages.

A second much discussed point of difference between the NEA and AFT concerns membership in the bargaining unit. A basic labor-relations tenet is that management employees should not be in the same unit as nonsupervisory employees. Accordingly, the NEA is routinely dismissed by the AFT as a "company union" because it welcomes all certificated employees—including principals, supervisors and even superintendents—in national and state organizational units, and in most local units as well. But the picture for bargaining purposes is by no means as simple as AFT literature suggests, and the NEA-AFT difference here is more assumed than real. The fact is that in one place or another the AFT welcomes "management" people and in one place or another the NEA excludes them. Overall, the NEA seems to hold the more flexible and pragmatic position on this question—the AFT would call it equivocal—because NEA policies vary with locale, with job descriptions and with leadership qualities of individuals.

Donald H. Wollett, a labor lawyer serving as a consultant to the NEA's Urban Project office, says that what holds a unit together is community of interest, which is not the same as identity of interest. In the printing and building trades, he points out, everyone who possesses the skill is organized, whether supervisory or not. He adds: "I would wish that in structure and membership every teachers' organization could be like the Utah Education Association. There, in an outrageous breach of faith over a year ago, Governor George Clyde refused to follow the recommendations of his own committee with respect to state aid for education. A two-day walkout by teachers resulted, and it was led by the UEA president, Moroni I. Jensen. Jensen is a high school *principal*. The teachers didn't complain about administration domination. The complaints were leveled by school boards because their administrators were dominated by *teachers*."

Wollett reminds teachers that a big advantage in having an all-inclusive bargaining unit is that some of the most effective leadership may be found in the ranks of the supervisory personnel. The UFT itself discovered this when it chose Charles Cogen for its leader in early New York City negotiations. At that time he was a department head, and ineligible to vote in the election forced by his own group.

As a matter of fact, the AFT position on administrative personnel membership is by no means as consistent as the official line suggests. According to Wollett, the AFT wanted department heads excluded in Newark but included in Philadelphia, although Philadelphia heads had more of the duties of supervisors than did their opposite numbers in Newark.

From the foregoing it would appear that the facts do not support those who say there are two insuperable ideological barriers between the AFT and the NEA. Certainly labor affiliation is not essential to effectiveness for a national teacher organization. And the ancient difference over administrative member-

Mel Weinstein

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ship in the bargaining unit is more imagined than real. It is true that the AFT won't permit superintendents to be members at any level, while the NEA will. But the NEA has learned that certain administrators cannot be accepted in the local unit when the time comes for hard bargaining. And NEA teacher groups are apparently learning how to make use of leadership skill from the administrative branches when conflict of interest is not disabling.

If within the next few years merger is seriously considered by AFT and NEA leaders, what could the AFT bring to the marriage that the NEA doesn't already have? Besides some very energetic and effective leaders, it could bring a structural change which has made the AFT more responsive to its membership than the NEA has usually been. This change is the caucus system.

At AFT conventions two very lively parties are in action, each with a well-defined program, a slate of officers and a mechanism for presenting both to the delegates. This means that there is always an organized group in opposition to the people who run the federation, a group looking for issues on which to embarrass those in office, and offering a platform to dissidents and minorities.

Myron Lieberman, a frequent critic of both organizations, points out that there is nothing like the caucus in the NEA. In an organization of almost a million members, he says, there is no political machinery, no center around which a systematic, continuing basic policy can be developed and then brought back to the organizational machinery. If merger with the AFT should politicize the NEA, then democracy would be well served within this huge, cumbersome organization.

Speaking before a national institute on collective negotiations in public education at Rhode Island College in July, AFT President Cogen said: "Increasingly, educational commentators have proposed that the AFT and the NEA merge into one organization. We would not rule out such a possibility." He went on, of course, to say that there are fundamental points at issue between the two organizations, but we are still waiting to hear an NEA spokesman come as near as Cogen to recognizing the need for merger. Perhaps, like the U.S. Government in Vietnam, NEA leaders are waiting for military success. At that point the teachers' new-found negotiating skill can bear fruit.

The Westchester Gorillas . . . . . David Cort

All the news is not bad in the animal kingdom. As man and the other mammals both get more sophisticated, they have grown more tolerant of each other's company. Recently we have had new and overdue researches showing that wolves, gorillas, and even tigers are really quite decent and sensible creatures.

And apparently the animals have done some research of their own, satisfying themselves that in some cases man can be comfortably lived with. For an abundant wild life has been found to be co-inhabiting prosperous metropolitan suburbs, especially those, as in New York's Westchester County, Minneapolis-St. Paul, or San Francisco's outskirts, which are backed by large empty areas. Some of the animals actually prefer cultivated suburban cover to the forest. Westchester County, for example, now has respectable populations of raccoons, opossum, weasel, fox, mink, skunk, woodchuck, muskrat and deer. Some of the larger estates invite in archers to shoot the surplus deer, firearms being forbidden.

Most animals, of course, are nocturnal and generally try to avoid human attention. Of the night birds, Westchester has five breeding species of owls—great horned, screech, barred, barn, and occasionally long-eared. This past summer the county was finally exasperated by a population of 1,700 Canada geese. They were charged with committing nuisances on golf courses, attacking children, and being health hazards at reservoirs and swimming sites. The penalty for attracting human attention was that 300 were captured by game agents and deported to Maine. They are perfectly capable of returning to the very pond from which they were shanghaied.

Still, a lesson in unintentional conservation had been taught by Westchester's respectful use of the land. A still better use is a well-managed sanctuary, and the best use a swamp. Incredibly, within New York City limits, the Jamaica Bay Sanctuary has had breeding glossy ibis, black skimmer, American egret, snowy egret, Louisiana heron, least bittern, pintail, ruddy duck, redhead, shoveler, blue-winged teal, gallinule, coot, piping plover, quail and others, some of them exotic in the area.

Man's tolerance of other species met its most severe recent test in the gorilla, the last big ape to be discovered by science. The gorilla has always had a terrible press; everybody agreed that it was "ferocious to a degree" and lost no opportunity to tear people to pieces. Then George B. Schaller spent a year fraternizing with various groups of them—in perfect safety, as he described in *The Year of the Gorilla* (University of Chicago Press). He found them peaceful and social animals with only occasional twitches of nervousness, relieved by roaring and breast beating.

The mountain gorilla barely survived the first good press relations it had ever had. As *The Nation's* reviewer, W. S. Merwin, wrote, the new governors of Uganda, Ruanda-Urundi and Congo saw "no practical merit in the gorillas," which chiefly occupied a limited section of the Albert National Park in the Virunga volcano region. Gorillas spend their lives moping through the forest, stripping off vegetation and munching it. They are not even a tourist attraction, because they don't want to be. Cattle were moved into their range, rapidly ruining the herbage. In final contempt, hunters were allowed in. The mountain gorilla may very well now be extinct. There remains the West African lowland gorilla in the area from Nigeria to Rio Muni, and inland as far as the Ubangi River.

Since the gorilla is fairly closely related to us, this episode should seem to us tragic. But the question

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naturally suggests itself: why not move the gorillas from Africa to Westchester County? First, the gorillas wouldn't like it since they need year-round vegetation and are subject to pulmonary diseases. Second, even ganders make Westchester nervous. For gorillas, Africa has advantages over Westchester.

But the principle of moving animal species is far from fanciful. A number of species survive only or largely in zoos and preserves. On the Russian steppe where the tarpan, the wild horse, was exterminated, the Russians run eland and zebra from Africa. And protection also works, even sometimes when the prognosis seems hopeless. The Russian antelope, the saiga, was down to a few hundred animals in 1930 but, with protection, has come back to 2 million and furnishes 6,000 tons of fine meat a year. The Alpine ibex was extinct except for sixty animals in the Italian Alps when King Victor Emmanuel II made its habitat a royal hunting park. By 1938 there were 3,000. Hunted savagely by the Germans in World War II, but now back at 3,000, they are recruited to repopulate the mountains of Switzerland, Germany, Austria and the Carpathians. For another example, the European bison has been rescued from extinction and is being redistributed to its old European ranges from stock in Poland's Bialowieza Forest.

A curious fact is that it is far more considerate of the land to graze wild-meat animals than domesticated cattle, sheep and goats; domestic herds eat everything while the wild ungulates specialize, leaving much of the herbage intact. The goat is said to have ruined all southern Europe. Its old pastures are now naked, eroded wastes. The terrible word, "overgrazed," is rarely applied to country inhabited by wild animals with their accompanying predators.

It might be suggested that man has corrupted his domesticated cattle, sheep and goats into the vice of overgrazing. And certainly this vice is irreversible. Nor do I hope to revolutionize the ranching business, or introduce eland meat to the American public. Still, the vast herds must take their toll of the American landscape, and also of the African landscape.

There now remain such protected enclaves as Westchester County. Europe in particular gives us contrasting examples of Westchesters and also of the ruined lands, brilliantly described and pictured in Kai Curry-Lindahl's *Europe: A Natural History* (Random House).

The Mediterranean shores were badly overworked by the ancient empires. During the neglect of the Dark Ages, they made a partial recovery. They are now in trouble again and "the ruin of the Mediterranean countryside" is at full gallop, from Portugal to Greece. Within a hundred years the Sahara Desert will almost certainly have leaped the Mediterranean to southern Europe. The soil has departed from hillsides; sand dunes are overpowering forests; in large areas no small bird sings. It would be surprising if the economies and politics of these nations did not somehow reflect the grim, and not invisible, process.

Against this background, Curry-Lindahl describes four great wildlife sanctuaries in southern Europe. They are all deltas, meaning that they are the accumulation of the debris from the heartland of Europe. One is Las Marismas at the mouth of the Guadalquivir; the second the Camargue at the mouth of the Rhone; the third the Danube delta into the Black Sea; the fourth the vast Volga delta into the Caspian. (However, this last is drying up, as is the Caspian, because of upstream dams. The shallow northern section of the Caspian is shrinking faster than the cartographers can change their maps.)

All four deltas serve as indispensable winter quarters for millions of birds from the north. The Danube delta is even more important as a breeding paradise, and has a rich mammal population of wild boar, badger, otter, brown hare, fox, a

(*Continued on page 260*)

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Cuba's Bestseller: A Gusano Returns

Jose Yglesias

However committed revolutionary Cuba may be to the Communist camp, its literary life is wide open: everyone is being published, and an old Marxist critic like Jose Antonio Portuondo can be challenged in his estimate of Robbe-Grillet by a young writer like Ambrosio Fornet and the debate go on for several issues of one of their literary magazines. The Biblioteca Para El Pueblo, a publishing venture specializing in foreign classics, brought out a list this year which included Proust, Kafka, Dos Passos, Faulkner, Mann. But nothing has excited as much talk as the big bestseller of the summer, a nonliterary work by a middle-class woman about the twenty-eight months she spent in exile in the United States before she decided to return. *Bajo Palabra* — "on parole" — came out in April, and the first edition of 10,000 was sold out in three days; by midsummer, another 100,000 copies were sold. Castro has worried aloud about errors committed in 1959 and 1960 which resulted in so many middle-class professionals leaving, but that was two years ago and no concerted effort has been made to woo anyone back, or to convince those on waiting lists not to leave. Marta Gonzalez's book on the life of a refugee in Miami may do the trick.

Marta Gonzalez's father was dean of the College of Education of the University of Havana. She attended the bilingual Ruston Academy, and went on to the University of Havana for a degree in foreign studies to prepare her for a diplomatic career. She was a typical member of that liberal middle class who welcomed the revolution at the beginning, and even worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until she left Cuba in April, 1962. She did not have a bank account in the United States, as some of the wealthy exiles did, but like all of them she left with the intention of returning when the Castro government is overthrown. She knew that the United States encouraged this temporary emigration—it *is* our best argument that the Castro government has alienated the people—and was convinced, as are all in Cuba waiting to leave, that in Miami there would be a warm welcome and useful, temporary work.

In Miami, she immediately learned that, under United States immigration laws, she held the status of a parolee: her passport was taken from her and a card issued, saying: "Your admission cannot be authorized at this time. You are PAROLED INDEFINITELY." This card reproduced on the jacket of the book has an explosive effect in Cuba: a symbol of the humiliations that the exiles suffer. Card in hand, she went to the Refugee Center and there underwent experiences similar to those of any American on relief, but which at every turn wounded the sensibilities of people who came full of illusions about their worth. For the $100 a month that a family group received (Miss Gonzalez came with her husband) she submitted to all the humiliating investigations that even a trained social worker cannot soften. In the case of the exiles, however, the investigators in the Miami Refugee Center were in the main Batista followers, and the first to get the plums. She had many complaints, not the least of which was that she was often hungry, for the monthly check was not enough to cover both rent and food, and jobs were not to be found.

The Cuban colony in Miami had, in 1962, hardened into a miniature replica of Batista Cuba: corruption and prostitution; scrounging for jobs and positions; frustrations turned inward, so that spying and denunciations became rife, with people suspecting one another of treachery when, for some, the monthly check was stopped. By 1962, also, there were no more TV interviews at the airport when they arrived, and the natives were becoming restive about the Cubans who had flooded the area; the Negroes' resentment was the most obvious, for they had begun to lose their menial jobs to desperate refugees. The proud rejoinder to the revolutionaries' epithet for the exiles, "*Yo soy un gusano*" (*gusano* means worm), had already begun to sound self-lacerating.

The book's popularity in Cuba is due, no doubt, to the many vignettes on the staples of life in the exile colony: the items in the monthly issue of surplus food; a visit to the Refugee Center; a Sunday at the public beach in Miami; the ruses worked out by family groups to get more than the $100 a month; the children's home in Florida City where those whose parents had sent them on ahead were cared for; the dentists practicing clandestinely in the colony. There are portraits of people well known in Cuba, so that the book serves as a kind of gossip column for, say, what Rolando, the famous dancing partner of Ana Gloria at the Tropicana, is now doing; or what the home life of Miro Cardona was like before he resigned his position as head of the exile Revolutionary Council, and what it turned into when he resigned. No wonder that during the period when the first edition was sold out and a second had yet to reach the bookstores it was known as the most borrowed book in Cuba.

Unfortunately, these vignettes are frequently imbedded in moralizing chapters. The author means to describe and analyze the values and mores of Americans as seen in Miami, but her observations are sometimes unfair, even for those of us who may rival Humbert Humbert in our reactions to fat women in curlers and Bermuda shorts. She is worried about young Cubans growing up in the atmosphere of sexual freedom that she thinks Americans enjoy, and she writes about boys in a public-school toilet playing with one another as an example of sexual experimentation which is encouraged. One passage deals caustically with the "American weekend"; the frenzied activity we go in for—from shopping to playing—on those two days seems unnatural to her, but she gives no indication that even popular American magazines have long been worried about how we use our leisure. Nor does it occur to her that the two-day weekend was won by American workers at the cost of strikes and picket lines sometimes as bloody as those of the civil rights movement.

In an interview after the book's publication, Miss Gonzalez explained that she had set herself only one stricture: to keep the chapters short and simple so as not to tire the reader.

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And it may be this is the reason for its remaining on the surface of her experiences. More likely, it is her middle-class tastes that make the book irritating at times; certainly her language has the afflatus that afflicts so many middle-class Latin Americans, and it is symptomatic that when she arrives in Boston and gets a job at the Widener Library, and feels she is among some real human beings at last.

However, a book on the exile's life in the United States which would have been unsparing to all responsible for the mess in Miami very likely cannot be written by a Cuban who left home. The rub constantly is that while she is compassionately describing the ill-treatment the exiles receive at our hands the reader is coldly responding: "What did you expect!" Yet, with all her limitations, Miss Gonzalez has the best of the argument: the exiles are in Miami because we wanted them there, and our responsibility to them is as great as to the men we landed at the Bay of Pigs. I suspect that they are such a great irritation to us because they remind us of our arrogance and failure in our dealings with revolutionary Cuba.

Now that we are no longer playing that game, our only solution has been relocation to communities which might be able to absorb the exiles in their labor pool, and we have again felt put out that they have resisted this so strongly. It is on this point that Miss Gonzalez is most convincing: relocation means to every exile in Miami that they cannot go back to Cuba. We like to pretend now that they came here as if to mecca when they only came to that tip of our nation nearest to their own in order to be escorted back quickly once we had dealt with Castro. What we extend as an unparalleled reward is to them the final betrayal. All of them felt so, and Miss Gonzalez, who in Miami had already had great doubts about having left Cuba, felt it no less than those who did everything to avoid it. Yet, for her, relocation was a catalyst to sanity; in Boston she was able to look back at the Cuban colony in Miami and see that, despite the meanness, corruption and humiliation, the lies they concocted for the folks back home were self-inflicting and helped to buoy one another in their illusions. It was a great surprise to her that at Harvard, when she made statements which went unquestioned in Miami, she convinced no one.

What the book does not cover is how she got back, and this is the point with greatest relevance for us, for those who want to return ought to be helped to do so. As a parolee, she revealed later in an interview in Cuba, she could not get a passport to leave, only a permit, after much waiting, to go on vacation to Canada for ten days. In Canada, a travel agency sold her a ticket to Paris without asking for her passport, and at Orly airport she called the Cuban Embassy because she had no entrance visa: a road that others are unlikely to take without help. At the time she wrote, 13,000 exiles had returned to Cuba, and anyone who has had any contact with exiles during the last two years knows there are many more who would follow them.

A year and a half ago, I had an experience at La Fonda del Sol, that expensive Latin American exhibit in the form of a restaurant in the Time-Life Building in New York, that made me feel compassionate toward the exiles in a way that Miss Gonzalez has a hard time doing in her book. I had dinner there with a Cuban member of his country's United Nations mission, and we immediately noticed that the many waiters and bus boys who hovered around our and nearby tables spoke Spanish with a Cuban accent. When coffee was served, the Cuban delegate, who had just come back from a Christmas leave in Havana, took out his pack of Agrarios, a brand of post-revolution cigarettes, and laid them on the table for all to see. What occurred was extraordinary and, for me, unexpected. We were immediately approached by every Cuban working at that end of the restaurant; word even got to the kitchen and a dishwasher came out to ask for an Agrario. In that setting, the delegate was taken for a well-heeled, newly arrived exile, and he was respectfully asked about a thousand things in Havana. Finally, after many pleasantries had been exchanged and I had counted up to a dozen visitors, the delegate told them who he was. With one exception, they unburdened themselves to him, told him how bitter was their disillusionment and, when we left, those who had only just found out followed us through two dining rooms to shake hands with him. A bus boy, no more than 18, said, "I was a *miliciano* and I would not be here, enduring these winters, except for my old man who wanted to come. I would give my life just for a peek at Cuba to see what the revolution accomplished last year."

The great majority are not this boy; they were as willing to come and make mischief as our government was eager to have them. We had a honeymoon going there for a while, but Miss Gonzalez's book is a sure sign that it is dead on both sides.

Cityscape at Tahoe

THE DESTRUCTION OF CALIFORNIA. By Raymond F. Dasmann. The Macmillan Co. 247 pp. $5.95.

Kenneth Lamott

The Destruction of California—what a splendidly evocative title it is! It calls up those sickening pictures on the TV screen of Watts in flames and, for those of us with longer memories, Nathanael West's hallucinated and prophetic vision of the burning of Los Angeles.

As it happens, none of these nightmare visions of destruction is what Mr. Dasmann has undertaken to write about. He is a biologist and a conservationist, and he has organized a methodical and useful survey of the despoiling of the land by careless, indifferent or greedy men since its colonization by the Spanish. The dominant tone of *The Destruction of California* is not, as the book's publisher would have it, "elegiac anger." Rather, the author, who teaches at a state college in the forested northern extremity of California, writes plainly, dryly, and straightforwardly about matters that are close to his professional interests. He puts the matter plainly and concisely: much of California's land surface is rapidly being turned into a desert of one sort or another while many of its waters are being turned into sewers.

Two or three years ago, I went up to Lake Tahoe to write a magazine piece telling how this once isolated vacation spot had been invaded by a steady, year-round stream of gamblers heading for the Sears, Roebuck-style casinos on the Nevada side of its

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shore. The editor of the local paper told me then of some concern about increased demands on the sewage systems of the local communities, which would soon nourish algae that, once established, could never be destroyed. In the brief time since then, the governors of California and Nevada have solemnly conferred on this matter, and various commissions and committees have been appointed. The algae are no longer a threat; they are, instead, a present reality. The latest report I have in hand is from a biologist who, last summer, discovered a flourishing colony of algae that were caused, as he delicately put it, by "human enrichment."

This is the sort of destruction that Mr. Dasmann is concerned with. It did not, of course, start with the entrepeneurs of gambling, nor with those state highway engineers who cherish a religious passion for building freeways. When, starting in 1769, the Spanish monks began to establish a chain of missions that reached from San Diego in the south to Sonoma in the north, California supported 130,000 Indians, more Indians in fact than lived in any comparable area on the continent. Now it supports almost 20 million people, few of whom have the modest demands of the Indians, and is adding to its population at a rate of something better than 1,500 people a day. The consequent rape of California's countryside, its waters, and its animals and growing things is Mr. Dasmann's theme.

The high points of the book have to do with the overgrazing permitted the sheep farmers on public lands, the clear cutting of the Douglas fir and redwood forests, and the extermination of the grizzly bear, pronghorn antelope, tule elk, beaver, bighorn sheep and the California condor. He describes the perpetual problem of furnishing increasing supplies of potable water to the masses of Los Angeles who insist on living in a land whose natural endowments are appropriate only for a sparse and undemanding population. He writes, furthermore, about the railroads, logging companies, public utilities and other free-enterprisers whose activities have all too often provided a stench in the nostrils of Jehovah. Mr. Dasmann is that rarity, a conservationist who is also a lover of cities, and not the least of his concerns is the state of California's cities. Finally, he writes with gloomy distaste of the chamber-of-commerce cast of mind that rejoiced when California's population surpassed New York's, and can see the future only in terms of increasing bigness.

Some of the troubles of modern California are matters of general knowledge and differ only in degree from what is going on elsewhere in the country. Even as an adopted Californian of some years' standing, however, I was taken by surprise by parts of the dismal story.

The grasslands that we see today, untouched so far by the real estate developer and freeway builder, have little resemblance to the fields of tall grass that provided abundant pasture for the horses and cattle and sheep of the Spanish 200 years ago. The grass itself is different, for in the wool of the Spanish sheep and in the droppings of their cattle were the seeds of weedy plants exotic to California. In the place of its needle grass, wild rye, June grass and blue grass, California has inherited poverty grass, tarweed, Medusa's head, foxtail and thistle. (An ingenious piece of scientific detection has a place in the story: the original vegetation was so thoroughly displaced that it had to be identified by examining the adobe bricks used in the missions and other buildings of the Spanish era.)

The original settlers' ignorance of any notions of range management is understandable. So, alas, are the motives that brought the miners here in '49, and it is entirely appropriate that California should have become an American province through the workings of undiluted greed. I recall my own puzzlement on first driving through a moon landscape of barren fields covered by boulders. On inquiry, I was told that this land had been worked by hydraulickers, industrialized miners who washed down small mountains with high-pressure streams of water in order to extract ounces of gold from tons of soil.

To cope with California's many problems, Mr. Dasmann suggests not only that we systematically apply the lessons of the science of conservation but also that we take deliberate and radical steps to discourage future growth:

This means not encouraging new industries to move into an area. It means not developing our water resources to a maximum. . . . It means not building those new power stations or those new freeways. No real-estate development will be built in an area where electricity and water will not be provided. No industry will come where it will not receive space, power, or water. Peo-

Cycle

SPIN

the whirling motion
the pressure of the
cyclical return:
earth around the sun,
around, around,
the beginning dance

TUMBLE

the roughness, hitting
of word against word,
syllable against syllable,
the tension between phrases,
to sing and not to separate

WASH

to clean the sound of errors,
pierce through the merely smooth,
create the true texture
that the glistening shines
dimensional with depth

DRY

out of the damp mystery
to dry the final language
on the bodiless page,
the word without water, air, earth
that speaks and cannot die

as the action
becomes the poem

James Schevill

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ple will not come where there are no new jobs or new housing. . . .

Hear! Hear! But I am obliged to add, sadly, that I can't imagine my friends and neighbors standing still for a moment for a program that so completely outrages the conventional piety of all right-thinking Californians.

Illuminating and intellectually satisfying as Mr. Dasmann's study is, I have an uneasy feeling that even if his recommendations were promptly put into effect, California would still be a dreadful and bewildering place for many of its citizens. Did the last-minute reprieve of Bodega Head (which was threatened with a nuclear power plant) make Watts or San Francisco's Hunter's Point a better place to raise one's family? In the long run, it surely did, but it is difficult to see an immediate connection.

What I should like to see next—not as a substitute for *The Destruction of California* but as a complement and companion piece for it—would be a book by a biologist of the spirit, a conservationist of the collective psyche. Together, the two books would tell us a great deal not only about what has happened in California but also about what can be expected elsewhere in the country. The winds of change are blowing from west to east, and what is true in California today may very well be true in your state tomorrow.

The Journey to Identity

COMING OF AGE IN AMERICA: Growth and Acquiescence. By Edgar Z. Friedenberg. Random House. 300 pp. $5.95.

Michael Vincent Miller

Brooding, like Edgar Friedenberg, about how a society runs its schools tends to get one entangled in the intricate meshes where social psychology meets political theory. After parents, it is the schools through which society perpetuates itself by inscribing its moods on the psyches of the young and shaping their behavior to its styles. Ever since Freud, we have been aware that our individual natures take a beating for civilization's sake. The relationship, which compulsory education helps monitor, between individual freedom and the social organism, hinges on a delicate balance if both are to flourish; but there is every indication that in the modern industrial world the scales have tipped much too far in society's favor. Professor Friedenberg's aim, in his new book, is to analyze the part our high schools play toward maintaining this imbalance in America.

Friedenberg is one of those rare hybrids — a social scientist blessed with a muse. In *Coming of Age in America* he writes with compassion and irony about the clashing encounter in the high schools between the adolescent, bristling with vulnerabilities and experimental stances, and the values of our relentlessly manipulative mass culture. His prose is fired by an extraordinary sympathy for the ordeal of growth, combined with anger at a society he feels is mangling the chances for a rich individual life. With Erik Erikson, who appears to be one of his chief influences, Friedenberg regards adolescence as the point of no return on the journey to identity. Adolescence is, or should be, the period when the rapidly growing youngster begins to test deeper emotions and explores ways to give meaningful shape to his private experience. A social atmosphere that encourages the teen-ager's subjectivity and permits him to select and reject various life styles is an essential precondition if he is to develop into a mature adult capable of passion, independent judgment and creativity.

There is little sign, however, that America is interested in producing adults with these character traits; if anything, they would pose a grave threat to the social order. Why should this be the case? "The essence of our era," Friedenberg writes in the first chapter, "is a kind of infidelity, a disciplined expediency." By infidelity he means a mode of role playing which springs from an invasion into all walks of American life by public relations and a vulgar pragmatism. The roles in which we choose to cut a figure are presented to us as the safe and easy means to successful personal relationships and achieving status. They make for smooth sailing through the society, but at the cost of genuine confrontation with oneself and with others.

A society which depends on keeping its members aligned in externally defined roles cannot afford to leave its young too much to themselves. The main impression one gets from Friedenberg's portrayal of the American high school is of a continual vigilant busy-ness on the part of faculty administrators engaged in shaping, restricting, rewarding and punishing student behavior. Friedenberg depicts the overregulated social landscape of our high schools with a novelist's attention to nuance and detail. He has little to say about curriculum, as his interest centers on other matters. For instance, he writes about a typical small-town school with a predominantly working-class student body: "Milgrim High's most memorable arrangements are its corridor passes and its johns; they dominate social interaction." Milgrim is a frighteningly totalitarian world where even the students' natural bodily functions are subject to regulation; the lavatories are locked except during brief periods between classes. There is no refuge from the sound of buzzers, the steel gates lifting and closing in the cafeteria, or the scrutiny of teachers on guard duty. Free time simply doesn't exist.

At other schools, the methods of controlling students are subtle and, on the surface, benign. High school administrators often draw on pat psychoanalytic notions to justify intervention in students' private lives. When a student violates the canons of established behavior patterns, he is promptly hauled on the carpet before the school psychologist or counselor to be straightened out. Psychotherapy is stood on its head: instead of fostering self-knowledge, its effect is to brutalize the privacy and self-respect of the young.

In order to examine the school system's effect on student values and attitudes, Friedenberg and two colleagues went into several high schools to test the reactions of 250 student volunteers to six narrative tales about situations arising in an imaginary high school. Accompanying each tale were nine cards which described alternative possibilities for evaluating or dealing with the situation. Students were to arrange the nine alternatives in a hierarchy ranging from best to worst. Friedenberg displays and interprets the results in a long central chapter which, although

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it is highly intriguing, strikes me as the least convincing section of the book.

The trouble is that one can see how the language in which some of the narratives are framed could limit the students' responses in content and depth. For example, one episode goes something as follows: A king from a foreign country is arriving on a visit and wishes "to meet with some interesting and representative high school students during his visit." It is suggested that the students chosen to meet him "should be persons to whom the school could point with pride as expressing what was finest and best about their school." The cards offer descriptions of nine student types as candidates for the job. Considering the quoted phrases, it doesn't seem very revealing about the volunteers' personalities to discover that they picked candidates who conformed most closely to conventional images of model high school students. Such candidates are obviously ones "to whom the school could point with pride." Mostly, what we learn from the kids' choice of cards is that they know exactly what the school expects from them.

Take another episode: Mr. Clarke, a teacher, finds a student named Johnny Barto smoking in the men's room in defiance of school regulations. Johnny is "a somewhat notorious character around the school." Moreover, "Mr. Clarke knows that Johnny should be in class this hour and furthermore, that he is a troublemaker, is having difficulty with his courses, is on probation, and that he is old enough to quit school." The alternative that Friedenberg's students like best, to his chagrin, involves having Mr. Clarke send Johnny to the school psychologist for counseling. Since school psychologists tend to be administration finks, this amounts to selling Johnny out to the system which will try to adjust him to its imperatives. Friedenberg would rather see Johnny given more leeway to find himself. However, here again I think that Friedenberg is looking for more richness of response from his group than the information he provided them merits. All that the kids are told about Johnny is that he is notorious, a troublemaker, on probation, and so forth. In other words, he is presented to them only in terms of an official school role, although a negative one (elsewhere in the book, Friedenberg points out that "troublemaker" is a school administrator's catch-all category for students who don't conform to code), and they respond in kind.

I am not taking issue with Friedenberg's thesis that high school students learn to think along utilitarian and public relations lines. His research results for the most part do bear out this thesis. But if it is true that the responses of the group being tested are conditioned by expectations that the tests themselves create, then these results do not add very much to what is said elsewhere in the book. Friedenberg the social critic, who dominates most of *Coming of Age in America*, seems to me far more perceptive and interesting than the Friedenberg who puts in an appearance as a professional research sociologist.

What Price Discount?

THE GREAT DISCOUNT DELUSION. By Walter Henry Nelson. David McKay. 237 pp. $4.50. (Discount house price: $3.69.)

Victor Lebow

The laissez-faire tradition commands obeisance to the virtues of competition, but the plain fact is that businessmen generally abhor and fear it. Competition is sacrosanct, but competitors who stray from the accustomed ways are heretics; and in spite of still another tradition, which glorifies enterprise and ingenuity, they are assaulted on pseudo-ethical and quasi-theological grounds. Each new species of competitor has received this treatment: chain stores in their time, and the cut-price stores, the manufacturer-owned stores, and many more have had to face this special form of pious disapproval.

It is now the turn of the discount houses. This book not only declares holy war on them, but also accuses the bargain-hunting shopper of being downright subversive. *The Great Discount Delusion* claims to be a defense of independent retailers, branded-line manufacturers, non-price-cutting establishments and, of course, the consumer, that most precious asset of the American economy. As consumers we are flattered, tempted and seduced by salesmen and ad men. Credit terms, ever more generous, enable us to gratify every whim. At a price, we can buy the products of 300,000 manufacturers and 3 million farms in 2 million retail establishments.

But at what price? Mr. Nelson wants to know: list price, discount price, "fair trade" price, off-price, trading-up price? Most consumers prefer to pay as little as possible. The discount house claims its prices are the lowest. The "fair trade" lobby wants to put the discounters out of business by requiring all retailers to sell their goods at manufacturers' list prices.

This is not to say that discounters are not guilty of misdoings. The author has compiled many instances of cheating, misbranding, overpricing and dishonest claims by discount stores. This, too, is in the holy-war tradition—only the sins of the heretic are recounted. The author is appalled at the thought that discounters may be bringing back the era when the injunction was: "Let the buyer beware."

He is, of course, doubly naive. *Caveat emptor* is still the safest guide. Examples of every one of these "sins"

Victor Lebow is a New York marketing consultant and a member of Columbia University's seminar on the Economics of Distribution.

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can be compiled for all the other classifications of retailers from the records of the Better Business Bureau, the Federal Trade Commission, the Food and Drug Administration, local inspectors of weights and measures and district attorneys.

At the door of the discount house, this author lays the high rate of destruction of independent retailers. But well before we saw the postwar emergence of the discounters, the Temporary National Economic Committee monograph on the problems of small business, in 1939, pointed out that "in the first thirty-nine years of this century, 19 million enterprises opened their doors and 16 million closed them." Since retail stores comprise by far the largest proportion of business establishments, this statement reflected a perennial phenomenon.

Like most assaults on one type of business practice on behalf of anotherother, this is a silly book. It is a mishmash of propaganda for retail-price maintenance, March-hare economics, and a purely medieval concept of competition. The author apparently does not know that practically every new form of retailing made its start as a price cutter—the chain drug stores, the supermarkets, the basement departments, even the department stores themselves. (Who was it that proclaimed he sold for "6 per cent less"? R. H. Macy & Company, no less.)

There are, indeed, real problems to be faced in this consumption-oriented society and its distribution system. "Waste! and want not," appears to be the prescription. There is waste in the duplication of products and the multiplication of brands. There is the built-in obsolescence of myriad products, from nylon hosiery to automobiles. There is the enormous cost of advertising, now probably well over $20 billion a year, if we take into account not only the conventional media but also such advertising materials as packaging, direct mail, displays, coupons and all the devices our ingenious promotion people devise.

Why is it that the farmer receives only 18c out of the consumer's dollar spent for bread and cereals, or only 29c out of the dollar paid by the housewife for her fruit and vegetables? How account for the fact that between 1957 and 1965 the wholesale price index for all commodities went from 99.0 to 100.4, while the consumer price index rose from 98 to 110?

We have been told that competition tends to lower prices. The best proof that it does not is provided by the supermarkets. When they first made their appearance, during the depression years, they operated on a margin of 11 or 12 per cent. Today they require double that percentage, and in July the index of food prices reached an all-time high of 110 per cent of the 1957-59 average.

The poor and the affluent together pay about $80 billion a year for the upkeep of the retail distribution apparatus, plus about $25 billion for the running of the wholesale establishments. Obviously, such rich plums will attract entrepreneurs, and since all newcomers to retailing use price as their chief lure, the discount house came to flower in the lush postwar economy. What helped make their success possible was the establishment of manufacturer-owned distribution warehouses by the big appliance makers. The infant discounter needed to carry no stock on his own floor; he shipped from the manufacturer's warehouse.

Mr. Nelson's opus arrives late. The discount house is fast becoming respectable. It has more than doubled its margins of gross profit, it has located its stores on the best streets and in the best shopping centers. And it has not solved the basic problem.

It is now almost thirty years since the publication of the Twentieth Century Fund study, "Does Distribution Cost Too Much?" That report estimated that close to 60c out of every consumer dollar went to pay for the cost of distribution. Surely, it is high time that the Fund published the follow-up, the up-to-date study promised several years ago.

But Mr. Nelson is not really concerned with the cost of distribution. And one must, indeed, question his knowledge of the economics of distribution as well as his understanding of the nature of competition. He is shocked by the sentiment expressed by one former discount-house executive and places this quotation at the head of one of the chapters of his book: "I have not found that people go into business for holy or moral reasons." Evidently, Mr. Nelson must feel that such a statement could come only from a heretic, a discounter. Had he read Adam Smith he would surely have come across that now famous sentence in *The Wealth of Nations* (published in 1776): "It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest."

ART

Max Kozloff

MOTHERWELL

In the history of 20th-century American art, it is difficult to find a major painter who was *not* decisively held in thrall by the spectacle of European modernism, abstraction in particular. Perhaps the one among our artists whose longing was the greatest, and whose attitude toward this tradition became the most complex, is Robert Motherwell. Youngest of the original Abstract-Expressionists, he shares their achievement — and their self-consciousness about it. In the forthcoming catalogue to his retrospective, now at the Museum of Modern Art (directed by Frank O'Hara), is included a slew of his writings. They are lofty speculations about the role of the artist, and of creation, as defined by our epoch. No one talks as voluminously, and with such lack of embarrassment, as does Motherwell of the problem of emotional continuity in art. It is as if Delacroix had been an Existentialist, erecting defensive, poetic images of himself under the cloak of aesthetic theory.

Yet, had I lacked the curiosity to read the artist, I would still have seen in his work the resonance of his cultural situation, and, in turn, discovered some special pleasures. This is not to speak of the iconographical baggage of his paintings, nor even of their obvious connection, in their immense scale and reductive simplicity, with the grand manner of the New York School. However relevant, such matters are, I think, secondary to a larger issue. To fuss over problems in words is one thing; to face them on canvas is quite another. In a career edited at the Modern with consummate finesse, and installed with extraordinary grace, there crystallizes a tension between celebration of the senses and a pessimistic awareness of

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the limitation of sense. Time and again, one witnesses a frustrated hedonism—frustrated not by physical deficiencies, but by the perception that enjoyment is only one aspect of creation. ("The drama of creativity is that one's resources, no matter how unusual, are inadequate.") Motherwell's outer consciousness works against artistic realization, but cannot be subdued; his inner unrest can generate great feeling, yet is not easily summoned. And, in my view, this so human predicament gives off an aura, rather than establishes the presence, of passion in the show.

But auras can have their life, their exquisiteness even. Perhaps this seems scarcely the right word to describe a host of very large, flat and dry paintings which play off only two or three colors, and which are zoned to purvey some quite elementary looking shapes: ovals, vertical slabs, curved loaves. There is an arid, tempered quality about these images which is yet not to be confused with blandness or faintheartedness. Had he wished, Motherwell could easily have plunged into the indulgent, softly luminous pastose Impressionism of Philip Guston. Or he could have gone sexy and visceral-biomorphic, like Gorky. Or he could have latched on to the aristocratic hysteria of de Kooning. Instead, while affected by them all, he saw his chief problem as expressive constriction rather than expansion of pictorial material. That is, he saw the forces at his disposal—even the colors to which he has the greatest attachment—as an anatomical source for invoking his personal responses rather than as a physical enactment of them. Invocation imposes a spareness upon the artist's vocabulary, and a deviousness upon his performance. It therefore fell to Motherwell to synthesize all the mythology, eroticism and automatism of the forties by the condensation of forms, and the discovery of ciphers. But simultaneously, he had to effect this goal through the heightened articulateness of pigment, demanded by the *avant-garde* ethic to which he subscribed. More than any of his peers, Motherwell sublimates his conflicts, of which the paintings themselves are visual embodiments.

As an example, let me take a 1962 canvas, "Chi Ama, Crede" (Who Loves, Trusts), in which a recurring flaw, a disproportion of the generalized over the particular, is held at bay. It is a 12-foot frieze of wandering tan zones, surrounding two utterly eccentric, squirming turpentine blots of cool rusts: all this laid on in very close values. Basically, the picture posits a contrast between restful opaque fields which hold the surface, and uneven stains, which, with their shifting shadows, open up a translucent space, and suggest a watery, organic agitation. But these rather hormonal blots are hemmed or even locked in by the ground at every stop of their fading perimeters. Here the artist reveals an overloaded liquidity that has dried up and been absorbed, and a mat, diffident façade that discloses an unsuspected strength. But suddenly, at one point, he withholds the paint tissue, and in an irregular glimpse of white canvas, flicks a whip of splatters that are almost electric, under the murky circumstances. The whole thing glows as a vicarious pageant of his psyche.

Oppositions of this nature are not difficult to discover throughout Motherwell's career. An amorphous spasm is found to eat away at some band or block, and yet be contained by it. In order for such struggles to seem truly serious, they must never appear urgent. This even applies to the seemingly brutal "Elegy" (to the Spanish Republic) series, which has become the trade-mark of his entire sensibility. On a wall in which five of these canvases (from the fifties) display their giant black silhouettes against white grounds, in one of the most magisterial ensembles I have seen in a long time, the "Spanishness" and obsessiveness of Motherwell come forth in about equal measure. Considered on one level, they are a monotonously decorative juxtaposition of vertically oriented black ovoids and thick bending pillars. On the other hand, they are all variously configured images of the same horizontal pressure, in which the ovoids are gently crowded or sometimes squeezed together. If these forms were meant to convince as individual structures, then there might be cause to view their more than seventy versions as redundant. As opposed to this, I judge them to be affecting proxies, occasionally brittle, at times relaxed, of the artist's deepest apprehension, unfolding in the slow, full beats of a pictorial pavane.

To any visitor of the exhibition, it should be obvious that Motherwell deals constantly in polarities. If black and white is one extremity, then barely differentiated value changes, accruing large fields, is another. This is not an art of small incident or variegated transitions. The same is true of his color, which impresses often enough by the absence of basic


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hues, rather than by chromatic imagination. When, as in the thirty-fourth Elegy, he adds a deep blue, grayed yellow, and red with orange next to his dark-minded anagram, the effect is of an unparalleled elegance. But only once, in the magnificent "Je T'aime," IV (1955-57), does he really plume a vision of painting which otherwise is quite Franciscan in mood and guise. In general, the alkaline palette runs toward sandy ochres, discreet siennas, olives and a powder blue, oddly piercing when he wants it to be, but more typically sulky. And all this is manifested by a declarative, yet thin brushing that neither pauses to ingratiate nor to skimp the weight of any area. Like Jules Renard, Motherwell seems to care for "cakes that taste a little like bread." His cool handling and subdued color not only act as a foil for his hieratic forms but conserve an energy that does not have to test itself.

Historically, finally, the retrospective has considerable interest. Here, for instance, are the important early collages (how congenial they seem to his temperament): "Pancho Villa, Dead and Alive," 1943, or "In Yellow and White," of 1949. They are fresh, unstudied works that yet, in the first, pull Cubism and Surrealist calligraphy tightly together in a decorative linear compound; and, in the second, demonstrate a new painterliness—in paper. Here also, is the small-scaled "Beside the Sea" series of 1962, in which an arabesque of lightly flung paint is permanently suspended over a bar of shore. Then too, one has the mammoth current works, whose direction is yet too problematical for me to gauge. At any rate, what is distinct about Motherwell among the Abstract-Expressionists is the muted, distraught echo he alone gives of the Mediterranean tradition. For him, a shape does not exist to be exploded or to be employed decoratively, but as an instigation of ancient memories. It is not so much the look of his paintings as it is their romantic premise that brands him vividly of his time. Between the turbulent Expressionists and the monolithic color-field painters, he reiterates a third alternative, provocatively hard to describe. At the moment, his paintings have to make their way in a world in which art is not sacred. If I at one time feared for their staying power, I now see that, contrary to Motherwell's own doubt, their resources are adequate after all.

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THEATRE

Harold Clurman

HAPPY DAYS

The alternant performances of Beckett's *Happy Days* at the Cherry Lane: Madeleine Renaud in French, Ruth White in English, offered a contrast not simply in languages but of acting styles. One might say that Madeleine Renaud and Ruth White, being separate individuals, would naturally differ in their presentation of Winnie, the lady who speaks with very little interruption by her husband for an hour and twenty minutes in Beckett's play. But the difference extends beyond personalities. There is a difference of approach that is related to national character, to tone and techniques characteristic of the actresses' cultural backgrounds.

Renaud's interpretation made the impression of a remembered performance. She herself does not seem fully there! By this I mean that the French actress went through the part, studied the meaning of its every phase and phrase, and perfected every device of voice and gesture which she might use to convey those meanings. These signs or indications of the character's traits and of the author's intentions are rendered with sharp accuracy, intelligence and polish. The result strikes one as a duplication or copy of something initially conceived and perhaps felt. It is a superb demonstration or explanation, but none of the original impulses seem to be *present.*

This is classically French. For the French — as Diderot once preached and Coquelin practiced—believe that the actor first experiences or recognizes the emotion of his part and then, observing its manifestations, fashions a form that will most attractively embody it. There is of course an intimate correspondence between the actor's first inspiration and the means by which he chooses to reproduce or imitate it. Still, little attempt is made to forge them into an organic unity. This gives the practiced French actor—and Renaud is one of the most accomplished exemplars of the tradition today—a certain objective quality which induces in the spectator a sense of seeing the finished portrait at a distance.

An American actor will aim to make his chacracterization happen, so to speak, immediately and afresh at each performance, to make it an event being born and living at the very moment we witness it. When the French actor is inferior, we get a disillusioning artificiality or emptiness; when the American actor fails he becomes strained or self-indulgent.

Happy Days changed with the alternation of cast. Renaud made the play crisper, harder, more ironic. Ruth White lent it greater humor, humanity and much more variety. The play thus acquired a tenderness which adds to its stature by making it more complex or, at any rate, less pessimistically unilinear.

If Beckett is at all like Gorky in this respect, he might say, as the Russian dramatist did, of two productions of one of his plays which were produced in Moscow at about the same time: "Both are right." But my own preference is clear. Ruth White is one of our most talented actresses. Only the sorry state of the New York theatre situation in general has prevented wide recognition of this fact.

After seeing its first production in 1961, then reading the play, then

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seeing it twice again in the surprise "repertory" scheme of the Cherry Lane, I thought I had had a surfeit of *Happy Days*. I suspected that it was more suited to performance on radio or to disk recording than to the stage. This I now realize is not at all true. Just as there is in its spare writing a wealth of subtle allusion, so every image and stage property —the use of pistol, parasol, lipstick and reticule, etc.—becomes strangely telling, indeed vital to the play's total effect and meaning. It is a bitter, funny, touching work — gratifyingly inconclusive.

FILMS

Robert Hatch

THE MARRIED WOMAN
MICKEY ONE

Jean-Luc Godard uses the screen less as a blackboard on which to outline a story than as a canvas on which to compose idiosyncratic montages of contemporary experience. Thus *The Married Woman* is built up from fragments of action; even fragments of people. Its time pendulum fluctuates wildly, its encounters are often enigmatic, and it is set against a background of social typography (primarily advertising) that is symptomatic of, rather than relevant to, the events under observation. The film is also punctuated by the visual puns (the camera zooms in on the word "danger" to produce the word "*ange*") which with Godard amount almost to a tic.

The woman of the title is trying to choose between her lover and her husband. The camera finds her in bed with the one and then the other —these are fine scenes of lingering sensuality; the camera itself seems aroused. We see her fleeing swiftly across Paris from rendezvous to rendezvous; we look over her shoulder as she thumbs anxiously (though it is implausible that Macha Meril should feel anxiety on the subject) through pages of brassiere ads and bust-development brochures; with her, we eavesdrop on two schoolgirls discussing intercourse. Once, briefly, we see her as an ironic, sophisticated hostess entertaining her husband's guest, but overwhelmingly she becomes, by Godard's ellipses, a woman in heat.

And that, it seems to me, is where Godard's method hobbles him. Lurking behind his flash-bulb pinning of people to the screen there is a story, and the viewer tries to piece it together. We learn that the husband is besotted by memory, that the wife suppresses the past in order to play in guilty irresponsibility with the present, that the lover is an actor who is made irresolute by an inability to know when he is acting. But Godard merely teases with his data of characterization, and one is forced back on the carnality of his people (in which they are much like everyone else) and never comes to terms with the minds and habits through which they might achieve some individuality.

He has not quite contented himself with a tableau that might be called "Modern Venery" and not quite given us the narrative for a story of modern love. The ambiguity is disagreeably pornographic (pornography being the sexuality of characters in whom otherwise we take little interest) and in grotesque contrast with the wit, elegance and invention of the supporting milieu.

Mickey One, in Arthur Penn's film of that name, is K from Hamtramck—a young stand-up comic of Polish extraction on the run from a trial to which he has not been summoned, for a crime at which he can only guess, presided over by judges he cannot identify. Is it real or in his mind? Given the flare and cut, wipe and jump style of slightly portentous photography, I believe we are meant to understand that, as for him, it may be largely in his mind, but for the rest of us it is real enough. Mickey is on the lam from the gangsters who hunt us all for the sins we forget having committed. And at the end comes an apocalyptic moment when, it seems, K at last meets Godot.

This is a very heady metaphysics that Penn has framed in slightly quaint Prohibition-era gangland. He has brought some flamboyant actors to it: Warren Beatty in the title role, Hurd Hatfield as an epicene night-club proprietor, Franchot Tone as Mickey's angel of doom. His camera work and editing have a slapdash energy that is invigorating. I enjoyed watching it — enjoyed particularly Beatty being as emotionally hair-trigger as Marlon Brando, and Hatfield engaging with Jeff Corey (who plays his partner) in fragments of Ionesco absurdity. Afterwards, though, *Mickey One* seemed to me less an organized creation than a quick run through of all the "in" devices of contemporary letters — the idea being that if you spin enough of them, and make it fast and noisy, *something* is bound to happen.

The picture sums itself up in a night scene wherein a mad artisan cavorts in front of a huge outdoor mobile that is engaged in destroying itself, to the delight of its creator and an attending crowd, when the process of pyrotechnic entropy is interrupted by the arrival of an indignant fire department. If this means that Penn sees himself as firing off in all directions for the innocent pleasure of lighting up the sky, it is a disarming admission. It would have been still more disarming if he had found a way to give Jean Tinguely credit for the self-immolating mobile, and had otherwise acknowledged that he was making sport with a vaudeville of borrowed ideas and techniques.

'English'

If she stood with you where the men playing
"bocce" roll the lead ball so it thumps on
the hard sand then twisting aim their bodies
like tight dancers along the subtle planned
invisible line it must cleave to to
win, would she then at last know why you in
that double-jointed fear of telling her
and not telling her will sit hours over
coffee sometimes pressing your hands around
the hot cup, and not look at her, and then
touch her long hair like some affectionate
brother or old man, never what you are?

Richard Lourie

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GORILLAS

(Continued from page 250)

tree-climbing wolf, steppe polecat, marbled polecat, European mink, raccoon dog, etc. Even better than Westchester.

But unlike Westchester, the virtue these wetlands have is their unsuitability for man. Certainly they could be filled, drained, and turned into golf courses. Then they would be dead; now they are the most biologically alive and productive kind of country on earth.

The European model for the Westchester way of treating the countryside, according to Curry-Lindahl, is of course England. There is only normal erosion and plenty of room for wild life, though not for wolves, wild boars or gorillas. England far surpasses Westchester in intelligent love of the flora. Even Scotland, though largely deforested, has kept its moors from erosion, and has a good game population.

Belgium, to my surprise, is another Westchester. A single Belgian town park holds more birds of more species than an area in Sweden twenty times as large. The Ardennes Forest, grimly famous as the strategic key to the Battle of the Bulge, is more graciously a splendid game sanctuary.

France, though careful of its flora, is much less sympathetic to its fauna. Its first national park was created as late as 1914. Even in the Camargue reserve, shooting is often heard, and often at night! In the latter case, most of the game would escape, wounded, to die in the dark.

Naturally, animals do not want to live with people like that. In contrast, the Swedish moose has learned to adapt itself to farmland, which it shares with the decent Swedes. The American moose, however, still boycotts people.

The obvious fact about America is that with mechanized agriculture, less and less land is needed to feed its people. A program of removing surplus land from the tax rolls and letting it revert to its wild, virginal condition would seem perfectly feasible. This is happening anyway, unsystematically, without premeditation or coordination, in New England, Appalachia, parts of the Rocky Mountain plateau and other marginal areas. The land goes up for tax sale and is not bought.

Man has two opposite choices in dealing with the land. One is to care for it, as in Westchester. The other is to let it alone, as in the wetlands. In the United States, the letting alone should be extended to large parts of southern Florida and Louisiana, the salt marshes of the Southeast coast, such as the Dismal Swamp, the Texas coast, the wetland behind Charleston, S.C., New Jersey's Mullica River salt marsh, New York's Montezuma marshes and those along the Hudson River, the swamps near Ipswich, Mass., the Illinois refuges along the Mississippi, upper Minnesota, and California's Petaluma and Suisun marshes. To a politician's or a realtor's mind a marsh is so much lost development and lost taxes; a marsh sorely needs the protection of people who really like this country. Sometimes one wonders how many of them there are.

Some citizen groups have already been formed to persuade local governments to grant tax forgiveness to such abandoned land, or to remove it entirely from the tax rolls. Since local government is never enthusiastic about renouncing taxes, such a program probably needs federal support. Meanwhile, through such organizations anybody who really likes his country can go to work saving some of it right now, or at least tomorrow morning.

Now, where do we put those gorillas?

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